Originally Posted by Organfreak
Well sir, now that we have AF447, maybe they will reconsider, eh? Are certifying authorities always right the first time?
Where is the icon for 'pppfffttt!'?
They won't. So far no one has come with solid reason why they should. Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I don't think that powers that be consider statements preceeded by "I think", "I feel", "I find" and "I believe, made on anonymous forums worthy of their attention. Those who really believe they can contribute to improvement of certification standards should better send their signed opinions to relevant authorities instead of airing them on PPRuNe and similar fora.
Originally Posted by TTex600
What I find disturbing is that the airplane (AB) was designed to prevent such an event, but failed.
Given current level of technology, it wasn't and it couldn't be designed to protect from stall when having no realistic airspeed measurement. Of course, if you have idea how to overcome it, I would be delighted to hear it.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
If the AF447 crew had an AOA indication and had been trained to use it, the only valid explanation for allowing the stall would be a death wish or both pilots sleeping.
They had aural indication of excessive AoA.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
I doing ok Clandestino, thanks
So you realize the aeroplane was stalled. Do you realize, that when stalled all bets regarding controls authority are off except that it should be sufficient to unstall the aeroplane if appropriate control inputs are applied timely? Alternatively, if such criteria can not be met, aeroplane has to be equipped with automatic stall prevention device, colloquially known as pusher. Aeroplane was pitching down even with full nose-up elevator, when power was reduced so there is no need for precise pitching moment diagrams to see that connecting AF 447 with horror stories of irrecoverable stalls and swept wing pitch-ups is not red but infrared herring.
Originally Posted by CONFiture
Then we both agree that both elevators should show a full down deflection.
If it is true, then both of you are unaware of lag associated with hydraulic powered controls.
Originally Posted by TTex600
An incorrect instrument.
So far there's no indication that any instrument on board of AF447 failed. ADRs correctly measured pressure in total line. That it wasn't total pressure is not instrument failure but probe clogging.
Originally Posted by jcjeant
For a Curtiss Jenny .. a pitot tube clogged was not a very important problem ... for a Airbus or other brand using automation .. it's a crucial data loss
It's manageable. Same way it was on JN. Attitude + power.
Originally Posted by BOAC
anyone clearly told us why the PF's 'ATT/HDG' was changed to 'FO on 3' where I think it stayed and what that would have done in the circumstances?
I'm certain it's just me but I couldn't find reference to the occurrence mentioned in interim3, could you please direct me?
Originally Posted by TTex600
Thanks, my FCOM/AOM shows ADIRU input into the ISIS
Might be that airworthiness requirements got relaxed but on older Airbi it's not ADIRU signal input, it's shared pressure lines on stby instruments and ADR3. For pilots & maintenance folks it is of utmost importance to be able to tell the difference between the two.
Originally Posted by TTex600
I have been in a 319 that failed to respond to SS input asking for nose down. I was maneuvering, avoiding one buildup and flew into another which was a substantial updraft. I had already pitched for green dot trying to climb above the first buildup and when I flew into the second updraft the aircraft failed to respond to my nose down, fwd, SS input for a couple of seconds. I assumed at the time that the updraft caused a "g" loading that fooled the ELAC. The buildup was small and we flew out of it in a few short seconds
This is a very serious occurrence, sir. Could you please provide relevant NTSB reference (or local investigating entity's one, if it was international operation).
Originally Posted by Diagnostic
Note that only 13 UAS incidents had sufficient data available for the BEA to do a sensible review of them. Sure, none of the other flights crashed, but several were not handled according to the QRH,
Not a single flight where analysis was possible was handled IAW procedure. Atmosphere doesn't care if you use QRH as crutch, as long as you keep the AoA in the band that assures that the aeroplane keeps flying.
Originally Posted by Diagnostic
not all of them went into Alt* law
Yup. One out of 37 did not. Thirty-six out of thirty-seven went into alternate law. Some got stall warning. So pushed. Not pulled.
Originally Posted by Diagnostic
meaning that subsequent actions cannot sensibly be compared to AF447, etc. etc.
Eh?
Originally Posted by Machinbird
So, are you suggesting that the crew for AF447 were not properly selected....?
No. I'm just suggesting that technical analysis clearly shows that most of the AF447 puzzle solution is in HF domain.
Originally Posted by jcjeant
So .. are the AF447 airline pilots or not ?
1. Their paperwork has shown no anomalies so in the eyes of the law, they were.
2. Once upon a time there was a certain senior training captain who was smiling from the airline advertisements. Once he made a beginner's mistake of taking off without clearance. So died. Took 582 people with him. Do we call him non-pilot for that?