PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - AF 447 Thread No. 7
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Old 13th Nov 2011, 15:35
  #182 (permalink)  
airtren
 
Join Date: Jul 2011
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe;Post=164
You show me a post where I said the aircraft and systems were perfect.
There is progress, with the extending of the lack of perfection to "aircraft" and "systems" from "software" and "design".. .

At the risk of sounding juvenile, I bet you can't.
How much?

Not at all, I've stated outright that I don't think it's as big a deal as some are making it out to be, and I'll give you some reasons if you like:
#1. More than 30 UAS incidents in the A330/340 passed without incident. If not being able to see/feel the other pilot's sidestick was a safety concern, more of them would have crashed
#2. At least two aircraft equipped with interconnected yokes had a similar LOC/stall/crash event, one of which shows evidence that the F/O didn't like what the Captain was doing and did not overrule him.
#3. The sidestick design was approved by one of the most respected test pilots and safety gurus of his day.

On #1, "Diagnostic" has pointed out well and sufficiently the issues with it.
How many more casualties are necessary? to consider everything that may be a weak point important, or a “big deal”?
On #2, You're simply making my point about the SS location and virtual secrecy problem, and that of the "yoke" supporters, which is that the F/O saw quickly and understood well what was wrong. Why he didn't intervene is a completely different matter.
On #3, So what? I recall that others on this Forum refuted this point a while back, and you still think it is a "reason". Furthermore, you should know this if you have the expertise you've advertised: the approval of a tester cannot make a product, which is tested within certain limits, bug free!!!

To conclude, these are non-reasons, i.e. zero (0) value, relative to the AF447 case...

You should here what system architects from various industries say, about the "lack of visibility/virtual secrecy" of the A330 cockpit, and how this becomes an example of a typical bad choice for the control center of a critical mission system.
Well, when one has been here 9 years and has seen the same people make the same arguments over and over again, it's difficult to resist noticing and commenting on the pattern.
So, you had your self assumed badge for about 9 years? I've joined in July 2011, and your ""anti-Airbus brigade" defense badge" is outshining anything else that I could notice of similar nature.

As, I said before, I think you should reflect on this: do you really think Airbus needs this type of help?
I hope I've answered your questions, so as such I see no systems weakness in the design other than the pitot tubes.
Please clarify, elaborate, explain this, as it is quite unclear what you mean.
Perhaps you'd be kind enough to give me the benefit of your opinion on the matter.
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