Coming back from the "dead" (I prefer resting
) to point out that Lyman has received no PMs whatsoever from me for a considerable time. Organfreak has received none from me full stop.
Old Carthusian has oversimplified to the point of making an incorrect assertion, but that doesn't invalidate what he's saying. The problem is, so has Lyman - "Commanding a dive" is a completely incorrect description for what autoflight was doing, which was attempting to hold altitude in turbulent conditions.
Organfreak, let's be clear here - I'm not saying that the pilots were incompetent and I'm not saying the software or design is perfect. I'm saying that this incident appears to be caused by a systemic problem when it comes to training, as well as a significant safety blind spot when it comes to how AF was rostering flights once the UAS problem was known and highlighted. I get annoyed with the yoke/sidestick argument because it is a *distraction* - there is no quantitative evidence to suggest it would have made a difference, and what we have is a few posters (not all of whom are pilots) with an axe to grind trying to make the argument all about them and their prejudice.
TTex600, air data has been processed on its way to the gauges for as long as gauges have been around. Whether the processing was mechanical, electric analogue or digital, it has been done - the only way to provide a direct translation would be to blast the pilot in the face with air channeled from the outside.
All the indications so far indicate that the standby (ISIS) panel was working for everything except speed (and the speed came back later in the sequence). You know you can see it fairly clearly from either seat. Even if the RHS lost all air data (airspeed and altitude), he'd still have had the attitude indicator and should have been able to read the standby. If he didn't feel confident with the information he had, the correct thing to do would have been to hand over control.