Interesting reading but the strong inference must remain that the 3 crew at no time seriously considered that they were stalled and at no time applied appropriate inputs to attempt to address a stall. Can't see how yoke/aoa gauges are relevant. Perhaps they would have made a difference, we can never know, but they should not have been needed in any case. Dialogue articulating the pull-up inputs is clear enough on the transcripts so can't think anyone was seriously misunderstood for any appreciable period.
Had the situation finally been appreciated and the subsequent recovery hindered through lost time or absence of some instrument, OK. But it never got to that point.
The lead up to the stall almost certainly had to result from mental processing overload on the PF, and a hesitancy to act on the part of the PNF.
I agree that none of the 3 in the AF447 front office seem to have acknowledged or verbalized a stall (According to the released transcript). I have to assume that once stalled, the experience was too far from their training to recognize and would therefore have had to be puzzled out on an intellectual basis for a successful outcome.
Mixing the discussion of yoke vs stick and presence of AOA is like mixing oil and water.
If you had ever flown with an AOA gauge, had observed one in various flight regimes and in the Sim, and had became comfortable with the veracity of the indication, then when the stall warning began to squawk, your eyes would be programmed to look at the AOA indication for confirmation, particularly when the airspeed is no longer available in front of you. As long as AOA is moving in response to control motions, the operational assumption should be that it is valid (operational assumption = bet your posterior on it).
If the AF447 crew had an AOA indication and had been trained to use it, the only valid explanation for allowing the stall would be a death wish or both pilots sleeping.
There is a world of difference between stall warning and AOA.