This arrived yesterday. What conclusions, if any can be drawn from the contents, given the attitude to the use of AFCS in IRTs over the last 20 years? We all knew that what goes in the test goes in the course (in other words you are taught to pass the test - and little more) so why no requirement to demonstrate full understanding of the automatics in the test?
G.
1 Introduction
1.1 On 18 February 2009, an EC 225 helicopter with two crew and 16 passengers on board struck the sea 125 NM east of Aberdeen whilst conducting a visual approach to an offshore helideck at night. Fortunately all occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft into life rafts and were safely recovered by search and rescue services.
1.2 The final Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) Report into this occurrence (Aircraft Accident Report 1/2011 dated 14 September 2011) made the following Recommendation to the CAA:
“Safety Recommendation 2011-050
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourages commercial air transport helicopter operators to make optimum use of Automatic Flight Control Systems”.
The CAA accepted this recommendation.
1.3 The purpose of this Safety Notice is to remind operators of the need to ensure the proper use of Automatic Flight Control Systems (AFCS) by crews through appropriate procedures and training.
2 Background Information
2.1 Whilst the introduction of AFCS in many helicopters has alleviated the piloting task by providing automated stabilisation and higher mode functionality, there have been a number of helicopter occurrences, including this one, in which the use of AFCS has been implicated in the consideration of findings or causal factors. The potential for hazard through inappropriate AFCS operation by the crew has been well-established.
2.2 For example in the UK:
• in February 2002 a police EC 135 crashed at night following the pilot’s selection/ de-selection of AFCS function;
• in September 2007 an EC 135 crashed at night after a disturbance from cruise flight and the pilot’s de-selection of the AFCS;
• in May 2011 an AS 332L2 under instrument flight rules unexpectedly pitched up and lost airspeed to capture and maintain the demanded rate of climb; and
• there have also been a number of level busts related to AFCS operation.
It is of note that the 2002 EC135 police helicopter accident resulted in an AAIB Recommendation that police operators should ensure that training in the use of autopilot systems be required to be covered by the operator during initial and recurrent line training and that the Unit Air Operations Manual contain instructions for the use of autopilot systems by pilots during normal operations.
3 Recommendations to Operators
3.1 Bearing in mind the above information, operators should carefully review the use and handling of AFCS by crews, with particular reference to the use of higher functionality capabilities such as ‘upper modes’ and flight management system coupling, to ensure that optimum use is made of this equipment.
3.2 Operators should give consideration to the particular circumstances of their operations and give best guidance to crews for the use of this equipment through operations manuals, reflecting this in the training and checking regime. During this consideration, the importance of retaining pilot competence in aircraft manual handling skills should not be overlooked and full use of simulator training opportunities should be thoroughly explored.