Going overboard with superfluous confirming switch selections. The FCTM states the essential confirmation items and this now appears in QRH.
Imperious "support" calls such as SPEED in a loud voice even though speed is within company tolerance. Usually done by nervous nellies as point scoring .
PNF "hovering" with hand creeping toward gear lever in eager beaver anticipation of the PF calling "gear up". Ditto flap selection with hands and fingers quivering on flap even though no call yet for flap extension/retraction. Ditto mitts holding heading bug in anticipation of turn.
Re autothrottle clutch motors. Boeing issued a Bulletin years ago (seen on Pprune in Tech Log occasionally) saying more than a slight pressure on the thrust levers against autothrottle operation may cause damage to clutches and cause incorrect AT operation.
Pilots that are lazy and rarely select the flap at correct recommended airspeed mainly on extension. Usually 20 knots or more in excess of manoeuvre speed recommendations although inside max flap speed figure. Sometimes called "using flaps as speed brakes" which is not on.
Lazy calling of 80 knots airspeed check on take off roll with the call often occuring well past 80 knots. Some pilots have never thought of also checking ground speed reading during 80 knot call even though recommended in FCTM as a fall back if erroneous airspeed problem is suspected.
Pilots calling 1000 to go when chime goes off rather than reading the altimeter for 1000 ft to go. In other words reacting to a chime rather than altimeter reading.
Pilots who have no idea of immediate actions in event of tail-pipe fire after engine shut down after taxiing. They then cannot locate this in QRH and faff around while the ground melts below the burning tail pipe. Although this is not a Memory Item, commonsense dictates you should not need a checklist to tell you what to do if it happens as passengers disembarking and ground crew yell there is a tail pipe fire.
Ditto suspected tail strike during lift off.
In simulator crew who "share" items during manual reversion approach and land. "You work the throttles for me and I will work the controls" Some regard this as good CRM. In fact it can lead to uncoordinated thrust/pitch coupling. This writer has seen Boeing advice that sharing the controls was never envisaged in manual reversion because one pilot can easily operate power and fly as normal. Boeing said if two pilots were required to be on the controls for manual reversion it would be stated in the FCTM and a third crew member would always have to be carried in case of incapacitation of one pilot.
Fast taxiing and heeling around turns to make up time.