mm43
Just have a look at this graphic to confirm what ChristiaanJ has posited.
Some points i like to remember in viewing this graph:
The AOA was considerably higher than 30°, BEA states that it never went below 35°. In a former thread the AOA was computed (GS and descent rate) at something like 60°.
The graph assumes, that the FPA (flightpath angle) would decrease with the THS and elevator full ND. Out of my practical expierience and my theoretical knowledge with full stalls and spins the FPA would increase considerably in the process of reducing AOA due to increase in descent rate. That leads initially to a chasing of the AOA. If stopped too early, secondary stall is preprogrammed.
Although the graph only shows the THS and the elevators, the behaviour of the complete aircraft including the point when power can be applied again in the individual phases of the recovery is decisive in the validation of a successfull recovery attempt and the altitude required to accomplish safe recovery.
Another point validating the effectiveness and the time/ altitude required for recovery is the rate, with which the FCPC´s would change the position of the elevators in the short term and the THS in the long term. As shown before, the max deflection of the elevators the crew did achieve (with limitied SS down) was a reduction from 30° nose up to 15° nose up. And this reduction didn´t achieve anything noticable to the crew. Manual THS trim (nowhere mentioned in the books except in direct law, and never trained) and prolonged ND input would have been mandatory anyway.
It is easy on the paper, but it is already challenge in the aircraft in pure VMC with all gadgets working and it might have taken a wonder to do it in the Cockpit of AF447.