The big issue with Airbus was and still remains the lack of feedback on controls. They let their aircraft use one single channel to communicate with the pilot, the one through the eye, meaning an intellectual, a serial input to the brain. To a small degree they use the audio channel as well, however in this particular case shows how small: The THS movement is not audio connected, you can’t hear it moving, you need to look at it again, with your single serial channel.
This was from
Gretchenfrage(a very fine contributor) on the old thread and in my view is critical to the argument.Of course,its shouted down by all the Airbus apologists but its fundamental to understanding the lethal traps that this machine can land the unwary in.Same can be said of spoiler activation on landing..you see,hear and feel the activation of this important retardation device in a conventional a/c.In Airbus,you look for it on the ECAM.
Add the deactivation of the stall warning when the a/c remained in the stall and you can see how the trap was set.But I agree this was pilot error from the moment the Captain left his 2 FO's in charge of wx avoidance at night in the ITCZ to the time that the pitots blocked and the UAS procedure wasn't followed.How very sad.How much Airbus design will figure in the final report's causal factors will depend on BEA's impartiality and integrity.I dont hold out much hope.