The FO said he planned to touchdown at 1,000 feet or less from the approach end of the runway, that he saw the runway about 300 to 400 feet above the ground, and that it looked like it was contaminated with snow. Once he transitioned to visual conditions he attempted to use the 1,000 foot marker as an aim point, and he believed he touched down firmly at about 800 feet past the threshold. He said when he tried to go into reverse, the levers moved slightly but he could not get the thrust reversers (TRs) out. On his second attempt to deploy the reversers, he told the captain that he could not get them into reverse. He said the captain took control of the TRs and told the FO to steer. The FO said he did not feel deceleration from the auto braking. He heard the captain say something about braking and he hit the brake pedals and went to max manual braking, but "the airplane felt like a sled." The captain confirmed that the flight landed as planned on "the first part of the runway," and that he told the first officer to recycle the thrust levers after they failed to deploy. The captain said he took control of the reversers and recycled the thrust levers 2 to 3 times and that both of them went to maximum manual braking but did not feel deceleration.
The FO said the TRs finally came out at about 2,000 feet or less remaining of the runway, and he could hear them operating but the deceleration was not normal. He saw the runway lights at the end and chose to go to the right because it looked smoother and he wanted to avoid hitting the lighting. He said there was about 3 feet of snow at the end of the runway where it had been plowed, and they impacted the snow, which stopped the airplane
Both pilots said the speed brake lever was armed during the flight, and it was still in the armed position after the aircraft stopped. Max autobrakes were set but were still in "max auto" after stopping. The captain said he did not check the "autobrakes" light during or after landing, and he did not look at the EICAS (engine indicating and crew alerting system) because he was looking out at the runway. The captain said he did not call out that the speedbrake was not deployed during landing, although the callout was part of the procedure. Both pilots confirmed that AAL policy was that speedbrakes should be deployed manually if they do not deploy automatically. The FO said that he noted the "left reverse isolation valve" and "auto spoiler"6 messages were on the EICAS after the incident.