LAL
Thanks. I am aware of the difference between a deployable unit (with the demands of keeping up to speed with operation stuff) and a UK based training outfit with no front line role. I unaware, however, of what the rejected
RNR/Harrier idea (which the First Sea Lord backed) proposed. Was it to provide a capability that was deployable but at lower readiness, or merely to provide embarkations for training purposes limited periods?
If it was the later, then the operation of fast jets by commercial operators (such as Hawker Hunter Aviation, or Serco operating the FRADU Hawks from Culdrose in support of FOST) prove that it can be done. Also there is a privately operated Sea Harrier - dismantled and shipped stateside by Art Nalls, and now flying on the US airshow circuit.
MG/fw/OA/5F6B/Biggus/james/BomberH
I never realised that book burning was so popular!
Many of the things you have outlined were indeed bonkers, in fact some of them got a mention on this thread. However, the last minute decisions which led to the axing of Harrier (source:
here) were particularly poor. Indeed, the First Sea Lord has publicly stated that the problems caused by losing CVS/Harrier
were/are his most serious concern post SDSR. Surely discussing the implications for the future, and ways to cope with the risks, is perfectly legitimate?
On the training issue, personnel exchanges with the US Navy (and France too?) will give Pilots experience of big deck conventional carrier operations, and is the
only way (as glojo and FB11 note) of training RN personnel in operating catapults, arresting gear, and so on.
However, only a few individuals can be trained that way. Since we will have a flattop in service for most of the decade (
Illustrious until 2014,
Queen Elizabeth soon(?) after that), we could embark foreign Harriers. Embarking foreign Harriers (in the absence of our own) would give experience of working with jets at sea to a greater number of personnel - chockheads and others on the flightdeck, the OOW, Navigating Officer, and others responsible for the navigation and ship handling aspects, and many others.
Some of the comments from politicians suggest that they did not really understand how much activity is need by the ship to support aviation. The
Telegraph recently
quoted a senior (sic) naval officer:
The lack of adequately training personnel could delay the carrier coming into service by another three or four years, the Navy commander has said.
Another officer has told The Telegraph that the loss of carrier deck handling skills could prove "disastrous" with fatal accidents caused by inexperienced ratings.
The other issue is capability. Do we need to address the shortfall in maritime strike capability? If we do, then how? Some regenerated Harriers? What about some regenerated Sea Harriers from Culdrose (idea <100% serious)? Marinise more Apaches perhaps? Or lease some AV8Bs with a nice support MOU (as I
suggested)?
Some of you might be tempted to say increase the TLAM capability. Not a bad idea, except that this decade SSN numbers will fall below seven, as we simply cannot build
Astute boats as fast as the
Trafalgar class are paid off.
This is what I was trying to say on the previous page.
Here is something that might interest some of you: a
Talk Radio show from the United States that discusses the Lessons from Libya.
The loss of the RN's carrier capability, the SDSR, and our Prime Minister are only mentioned in passing, However, much mention is made of shipborne aviation by both the French Navy and the USMC. Again they note that operating from a ship ten minutes away from the coast does have advantages over bases much further away - including greater responsiveness and a faster decision making cycle. Much is made of organic C4ISTAR.
After Libya, where will the next operation be? Probably a littoral one - which is unfortunate as SDSR seems to have been based on land operations in landlocked places. Will our Government be willing to do a post Libya "lessons learnt" study?