Originally Posted by The Shadow
You really cannot blame the crew.
They experienced (i.e. quietly slipped into) a pitch-up (and thrust-) induced, and very insidious, deep-stall entry at high altitude - a straight unapparent and unremarkable entry into a very high descent rate, featuring a quite misleading and almost normal pitch attitude.
That could be good analysis of some accident that has not much in common with AF447. Before we go on having a productive discussion, please clarify: are you writing about AF447 at all? If so, do you have more reliable sources than BEA preliminary reports, because most of what you have written flies in the face of the data released by BEA so far.
Originally Posted by bubbers44
I know they were new pilots but why couldn't they figure out what was happening to them? pulling back for 3 and a half minutes goes against all of our survival instincts.
Well, they were 58, 37 and 32. Not young. Not new. Not inexperienced. Pulling back goes against pilots' survival instinct but it doesn't go against the earthlings' survivor instinct when flying: ground is dangerous, I have to get away from it as quickly as possible. Most of people undergoing initial pilots' training have to be taught not to climb too steeply after takeoff.
Not understanding the relation between pitch control and stalling, consequently pulling no-matter-what, was identified as cause of stall related accidents by Wolfgang Langewiesche as early as 1944. There's old aeronautical cliche: to go up, pull the stick back. To go down, pull stick back further. Still applicable.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
even given erroneous readouts, the pilots should have had enough overall awareness of there situation that a stall should have been self evident.
Correct.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
the current fear that manual flying skills will atrophy as systems take more of a role appears to be valid.
Company and pilot dependent. When I was on bus, I was allowed to take out all the automatics and fly even without the FPV (birdie) in CAT1 and above weather, provided my capt was comfortable with that. They always were.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
there is now doubt that increased automation has improved safety but the major accidents I can think of recently, in the western world, have been in spite of automation or directly/indirectly caused by it.
That's quite selective view, helped by noticing something is wrong only when number of dead westerners in an aeroplane crash goes above the detection threshold. We never had less killed passengers per RPK than nowadays. If you'd like to propose different criteria of measuring safety, be my guest.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
Perhaps we need, as an industry and as a fraternity, to invest more in operator input at the design stage.
Perhaps we do, perhaps we don't. Some things could be improved, but overall methinks designers are paying attention to pilots input. All the ergonomic problems I've came across while flying were results of grandfathers' rights - it was cheaper to do the things way they were done 40 years ago than to invest in redesign.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
It is oh so easy to sit in the sim expecting trouble but it is rare in life to find ourselves outside of the norms
Not true. Just take a look at the Aviation Herald and that's just a part of it. Troubles happen everyday but they're dealt with as expected. Someone with just a passing interest in aviation will notice them only when they lead either to spectacular incident or accident.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
I am certainly not suggesting we go back to fully manual control systems
It would make no difference whether you suggested it or not. We still carry them as backup and are supposed to know how to use it to extract us out of any corner autos have driven us into.
Originally Posted by Burnswannabe
I suggest that we all need to spend more time in the sim being surprised as opposed to just knocking out the stats, even if this means more expense.
Totally agree.
Originally Posted by Intruder
What would have happened if the pilots just took their hands off the stick altogether.
Probably not much. Some altitude excursion, some roll, unlikely to be as severe as were the one commanded.
Originally Posted by Intruder
What would the computer have done?
Nothing. It usually does nothing. In AF447 case as it was confused by disagreeing airspeed, it wouldn't even intervene as the aeroplane was approaching the edge of the envelope or attitude limits active in normal law.
Originally Posted by Croqueteer
With a traditional column if it is back past a certain point the wing is stalled, and it is pretty obvious that the a/c is being held in a stall, ie the stick position gives a idea of attitude.
This is so wrong that is bound to be quite lethal if one is to try it in real world, especially in THS equipped aeroplane where column drives elevators only.
Originally Posted by 4468
He doesn't even know it's possible to stall an A320 in normal law.
It would be beneficial for our discussion if you would be so kind to explain in exactly which way can be any FBW Airbus stalled in normal law. Your words or copy-paste. Please.
Originally Posted by in my last airline
The way forward is for an externally delivered LPC (regulator) every 3 yrs covering all the normal items plus any number of potential items. Let's get back to 'hard, firm and fair' training and checking.
You're onto something but I'd rather see the G-man on OPC and a bit more frequent than three years.
Originally Posted by wet vee two
How often have you all practiced unusual attitude/unreliable airspeed scenarios?
UA every 2 sims, unreliable airspeed every 4 sims. Bound to get more often. Last one was total static blockade at crusing level. Brought it down in one piece, didn't even overspeed gear or flaps, which is average performance expected of pilots in my gang.
Originally Posted by wet vee two
The size of a modern flight deck, the eyes have a long distance to travel across all instruments
Well, then the Airbus flightdeck is positively postmodern with its smallish, yet big enough PFD.
Originally Posted by DiamondBob
What did the other crews do when their pitots were blocked? Supposedly this occurred 32 times on A330s and A340s before AF 447, but I've never seen any accounts as to how this was handled in those situations.
Kept on flying. Some were so unmoved by the experience they even did not report it and it was only through thorough analysis of QAR data that some occurrences were discovered. Interim 2, pages 50-53 refer.
Originally Posted by Ashling
The crew failed to recover the aircraft because they failed to diagnose why they were out of control. They died not knowing what had gone wrong. To me its surreal that they could not recognise the stall
...so far so correct, but...
Originally Posted by Ashling
but it would seem that the situation was beyond their training, experience and competence. How could they be allowed to be in command of a commercial jet in that environment when they didn't possess the skills required to cope when it all went wrong?
... you have moved a bit offtrack here. That they didn't posses the skills to cope with the situation just when they needed to have them is quite certain. However, we'll need thorough HF analysis to see whether their ineptitude in handling the incident and turning it into an accident was deeply rooted or it was just fatal momentary lapse of airmanship, brought on by fatigue or whatever else. You might be right, Ashling, but currently only by pure chance. We still don't have enough data to make correct conclusion.
Originally Posted by HPSOV L
They were an average crew on an average day. Maybe even above "average" when you consider their experience and the fact that they continued to try to understand the problem and regain control all the way down.
They tried and failed. Their methods were found to be wanting. Whether they were average, or even above-average crew, we'll need deeper HF analysis to tell us.
Originally Posted by HPSOV L
Statistically then it is likely that most of the posters on this forum, thrown into the exact same circumstances, would also end up in the ocean. And I include myself in that, hand flying skills and all..
You are right, as most of the posters on this forum are not A330 rated and quite a lot have zero hours TT therefore your claim is not particularly relevant in discussion about AF447. Interim2 is pretty clear on how other crews resolved similar situations. It's 37:1.
Originally Posted by ManAdaSystem
How do Airbus crew train stall recovery?
Currently, line pilots don't. Subject to change soon. That large majority of PPRuNers have no ability to tell stall from stall warning and consequently "stall recovery" from "approach to stall recovery" has lead to quite large waste of bandwidth and I don't expect it to change.
Originally Posted by lyo
Had a conversation with an AI FE. He told me about a test flight last summer.
Wow. I mean: wow! Such a spectacular flight and no one heard about it before you decided to share it with us. Either Toulouse is more secretive than Kelly Johnson's Skunkworks or someone let his imagination run wild.
References, please! Even if you have to shoot me after you tell me.
Originally Posted by BOAC
We are getting a bit confused here between 'full stall' and 'deep stall' I think, and in the case of 447 it was being held in a (amazingly stable) full stall (not a 'deep stall') by THS setting and elevator
Don't forget the engines. Low q, high trust.
Originally Posted by BOAC
I have just seen Lyo's frightening post regarding loss of elevator function, so yes, it looks as if could be described as a 'deep stall'
I've seen many posts like it and stopped considering them frightening, As long as we don't see some solid confirmation of it, I'll classify it as "sad".
Originally Posted by BarbiesBoyfriend
Whatever people say about 'ye olde dinosaur' pilots, they do have certain advantages over the children of the magenta line.
Have a look what Aviation Safety Network to see what real 'Ye olde dinosaur' pilots did. Not everything was related to not having autos or nav and safety equipment we enjoy today. Like hitting the ground below airport elevation.