The "Initial PITCH UP reaction" was a response to nose low. That tells us the PF was manually controlling the a/c.
Yet, HERE, it is known 'instantly' that UAS is the PROBLEM. I say, Why? Who among the 32 crews and the myriad sim brigade post UAS/447 debrief acted according to the existing briefing of the pilots of 447?
UAS at the time was criminally unaddressed, as was the re-select of a/p if it obtained, "The A/C may PITCH UP". STALL? Might be Bogus, OR NOT...
Yet here, after two years on, we know UAS was immediately the problem, and the pilot PITCHED UP into STALL that was annunciated once, as bogus, and a second time, as legit?
I am not singling anyone out. I merely note the certitude around a situation about which the manufacturer was blissfully unaware, yet pilots here know precisely what to do. Of course, but a bit late, No?
The a/c, prior to loss of a/p a/t, experienced some vertical turbulence. Was it in excess of the a/p limit to control? By rate or attitude? Is the zipper an attempt to control the a/c in the last seconds of autopilot, and the drop out was an innocent loss of autoflight due MET? UAS followed,
as the a/c reacted to turbulence?
Where is the useful CVR data between a/p drop and STALL? Why is it the dramatic and sad exchanges are included, but evidence of handling attitude and cueing are not?
Last edited by Lyman; 14th Oct 2011 at 16:05.