Good as it would be in theory, I am not at all sure that the MAA can be independent. There has to be a good deal of current Military involvement, otherwise it will not be an MAA, but a CAA for the military.
At the design and support levels civilian input alone may (should) be sufficient to maintain airworthiness which is not, in my view, in the world of military aviation always the same as safety. However at the operational levels this needs to be tempered by a good deal of operational judgement and to ensure that a real operational requirement (not one for an exercise, or for training) is met. If corners have to be cut then those curtting them should know they have been cut, record this and be prepared to justify there decisions, both to operational commands and to airworthinesss authorities.
Once there are serving military people in the MAA then they are subject to all the influences that have brought us to where we are. It then comes down to culture and to rules.
The rules need to constrain the airworthiness decisions of those in operational roles and these rules need to be known and the consequences of ignoring them feared by those who apply them. It has long been one of the RN's concerns that the SMR of a ship's Flight might be subject to undue pressure from a ship CO or Flight Commander to undertake unauthorised mods or allow an unserviceable aircraft to be operated. During my time Flight Commanders knew that the system would descend hard if the rules were broken, or even bent badly, and much effort was devoted to training and supporting SMR's so they were not placed in the wrong position.
An effective airworthiness culture can also be instilled, if the will is there. Way back when, even before my time, the Fleet Air Arm had a previous airworthiness problem, albeit mainly at the operational level. The answer, and the culture changer, was called "We have a Problem". Today it would be a "change programme" or an "initiative" but a rose by any other name..... Maybe it's time for a tri-service repeat.
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