The need for Regulatory Authority independence
I have had sight of three RAF internal reports, namely the Chinook Airworthiness Review Team (CHART) report, the Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team (NART) report and the Hercules Airworthiness Review Team (HEART) report, all of which refer to the RAF’s Airworthiness Systemic failures dating back to at least 1980. During this time, some 62 airmen lost their lives unnecessarily because of Airworthiness related accidents. The reports are an extended litany of Airworthiness problems and failures that have remained unaddressed and which are still extant for unexplained reasons.
I refer to not only the Chinook HC2 ZD 576 that crashed on the MoK on 2 June 1994, but also the Falklands HC1 crash accident in 1987. Hercules XV179 crashed after a fuel tank exploded and Nimrod XV230 also crashed in flames and the aircraft was destroyed in the Iraq/Afghan Theatre of Operations, after an internal fuel leakage ignited in the air. Two Tornados and two Sea-Kings are also post-2000 accidents that must also be mentioned. The 'systemic airworthiness management failings’, as noted by Sir Charles Haddon-Cave QC, were also apparent in these later accidents after the rot had set in the mid 1980s, when certain RAF and MoD policies began to undermine the maintenance of through-life airworthiness. If Haddon-Cave had not limited his investigations to the 1998 baseline, he would have discovered the same failings in a number of fleets as mentioned by CHART, HEART and NART.
I find it unbelievable that those in the higher RAF echelons have consistently ignored the danger signals identified by their own senior investigating staff, thus allowing the systemic failures situation to fester-on, waiting for the next time a Service aircraft crashes due to the ongoing state of affairs.
That the MAA and MAAIB were created after the Haddon-Cave review is a step in the right direction. However, I speak as a retired Regulatory Authority inspector with 20 years of service in what was a truly independent UK Regulatory Authority, before EASA turned it into a Gateway to oversee the application of EC regulations. I proudly worked alongside those who previously regulated aviation Airworthiness independently as the Air Registration Board (ARB), later integrated into the CAA. They accepted no nonsense from Operators or Manufacturers in respect of the airworthiness standards they required to be maintained and did so without fear nor favour, whilst the Flight Operations department within the Safety Regulation Group, supervised UK airline operations in parallel. We were a truly independent Regulatory Authority in thought and in action, with set standards that were not negotiable.
I sincerely believe that like the CAA and the ARB, the present MAA headed by ACM Timo Anderson & its MAAIB offshoot, would have full freedom to operate a lot better if allowed to work without any MoD dependence whatsoever, so that they can act in the best interest of the Services; regardless of the current spin emanating from Whitehall that both are now truly free to perform independently. Really?
Ralph Kohn FRAeS
Retired airline captain and Regulatory Authority Fight Operations inspector & examiner of airmen
Compiler and co-author of the Chinook ‘Macdonald Year 2000’ report as later updated