BOAC, “… contam/slippery …”, “Limiting LDR/A's do not need to be in this discussion.”
I would agree, but a significant issue in accidents appears to stem from the inability (reluctance, omission) of crews to change ‘habit’ from otherwise normal operations.
This might be due to poor assessment of the situation, or mistakenly assessing a potentially difficult situation as benign. These problems might be aided by inappropriate SOPs, a complacent attitude to braking – the use of standard autobrake settings without correlation with the conditions.
Thus an operator’s choice in operation, even if commercially driven, must consider how they will aid crews in judging when and how to change operational priorities to safety.
Of course no operator would admit the need to do that (safety is always #1); also, perhaps many operators might not appreciate that with fallible humans the crew might not change when required – 'we have SOPs requiring a check', 'they will change to a new setting', but what triggers the new SOP and why would the crew do it.
Accidents originate from routine operations. The source of success in routine operations is also the source of failure; all I ask is that operators recognising this.