Originally Posted by
Turbine D
I have got to go with gums on this. The computer system, e.g., Alternate Law 1, Alternate Law 2 and subsets of Alternate laws are very confusing.
I almost agree - from an engineering perspective the gradual degradation makes sense (and Boeing must have htought so too as theirs is practically the same), but if pilots aren't trained in all the modes, they might as well be labelled "crash mode".
Only issue is that in direct (in A or B) I think you're hand-flying all the way home (or to divert). After what we've heard on training, SOPs etc., isn't there a significant risk in asking todays pilots to hand fly for what maybe a few hours, after possibly only a minor or transient issue ? Maye it is better to keep the in-between mode, which allows (in A and B I think) A/P to be re-engaged when things are stable again ?
1. Airbus failed to handle the pitot tube problems in a manner that they should have.
2. Airbus failed in their risk assessment/risk abatement to adequately cover the total waterfront, e.g., total flight envelope. They were nearly mute on flight problems at high altitudes and speeds. Guess they assumed problems couldn't happen there.
3. Airbus failed to provide complete key memorization items in their flight instructions for the A-330, leaving out for the most part, high altitude and high Mach cruise situations.
Someone made these mistakes, not sure it was Airbus in every case - some combination of Airbus, airlines, and EASA, yes. I would note that it was
AF (not Airbus) who issuesd a revised UAS procedure awfully quickly after the accident...
And in one sense it is
worse than above - someone (AF...) failed to train pilots
at all in hand flying at cruise in alt law (and quite possibly in
any law). Between SOPs and RVSM rules etc., it appears todays line pilots also get no
experience of hand flying in cruise either.
Result is that if A/P drops out for any reason (and on any type) in cruise, pilot is handed an a/c he has quite possibly never actually flown at this speed or altitude. Throw in the event happening at night middle of ocean, middle of bad weather, and the result isn't that suprising. Between mfr, airilines, and regulator, no one thought this lack of training / experience was a bad idea, or at least no one did anyting about it.
As in the role of leader, Airbus must not have/didn't push the issue hard enough with EADS, or so it seems or didn't view correctly the critical nature of pitot icing at high altitude and high Mach.
[...]
What did they advise EADS to do? Airbus has the lead here, not EASA. Did EASA respond appropriately based on Airbus' strong recommendations? Did Airbus have a strong recommendation?
We'll find out on that - maybe. Currently the director of EASA is refusing to appear before the judge to answer questions on EASAs role in this event.... [ and yes I am entirely sure that this is for the best of principled reasons and not because there is something to hide
]
Now Airbus knew the AOA was a critical key component to assure safe flight, but where was the indicator to know what it was and where it was going?
Agreed [for what my opinion is worth, which is zero] - stall warning / stick shaker is way too crude, no difference between "you are nearly stalled" and "you are stalled by 30+ degrees".
Just to be clear on the Airbus role though - the indicator exists, the space on the panel exists, the airline deleted it as an option when ordering.
The final report on this accident may well say that the AOA indicator should/must be there - the sad thing is that it won't (by a long way) be the first accident report to say that, and it will probably be ignored, again.
The operational side of the industry have decided airline pilots don't need AOA, and/or they don't want the expense of training on it.