While it is not politically correct (?) to say so but I for one dislike the "new" Boeing 737 procedures. I can never see the logic push for commonality between Boeing types. After all, each require a specific type rating and the chances of a 737 pilot going on in later years to fly a 777 is in the lap of the Gods.
The original 737 procedures I was taught in 1976 from a Boeing instructor pilot (whose signature was on the original flight crew training manual) had the captain conducting the greater part of the pre-flight, and after start procedures. The first officer's task was to read the checklist using the long established challenge and response method. The first officer read the item (challenge) and awaited the captain's reply (response).
The current policy where the first officer does the majority of the scans and actions for pre-flight, before start and after start, has the less ideal result where he not only challenges but also responds to himself. Where is the double check of the past? The captain looks on as an interested observer to the first officer's hands flashing over switches then waits patiently while the first officer drags out the printed checklist and challenges himself and answers himself.
It was this sort of convoluted SOP that could have led to a serious incident a few years ago in a 737-400 where the captain conducted the preflight scans because the first officer was busy on cockpit administration and the flight was running late. There was ample fuel in the centre tank but the captain forgot to switch on the centre tank pumps. Three hours later it was noticed that the wing tanks contents were down to 100 kgs either side. It was only then that the centre tank pumps were hurriedly switched on.
At the tea and bikkies session with management, the story was the captain took full blame. The first officer protested his own innocence by saying that the captain had usurped the first officers area of responsibility (which was to turn on the appropriate fuel pumps during before start) and that he (the first officer) would not have missed the centre tank pump selection had he been permitted to conduct HIS area of responsibility scan instead of the captain pinching his job. Et tu, Brute...
It could be argued that the so called `new` procedures was primarily to give the first officer something to do with his hands rather than be just a reader of checklists. Now the situation is the first officer is flat out once he enters the flight deck as a multi-fingered switch flicker ripping through numerous switches in his `area of responsibility` - as well as then challenging and responding to his own checks. Talk about a one-arm paper hangar.
One potentially lethal flaw in either method is where the PNF actions the after take off items without reference to the other pilot and then challenges and responds himself. At no stage does the current Boeing procedure require either pilot to check the pressurisation instruments - only the switch positions. It could be argued that is left to commonsense. Well, maybe. But in the simulator a significant number of crews fail to check these vital pressurisation instruments simply because they are not published in the after takeoff checklist. The Helios Airlines B737 accident may have been prevented if the after take off check list had contained the item "Aircon and Pressurization.....checked." This was in the original 737 checklist in 1976 but was later removed.
A previous poster on this thread asks the point of turning on the fuel pumps during a preflight when this merely leads to extra wear and tear and the pumps are not needed then. The same principle applies to the switching of the start switches to CONT or ON after engine start when they are not needed except under icing conditions. But the `new` procedures require these switches to be actuated after start regardless of the time before take off. On the B737-200 the Pratt and Whitney engine manual exhorted crews not to use the starter switches unnecessarily (unless for icing) because it decreases ignition system life. Does this principle not apply to the other B737 variants?
The so called "Areas of responsibility" have led to occasional tiffs on the flight deck where someone says "Hey! Don't touch that switch - that's in
my area of responsibility." This scribe prefers the original Boeing policy where the captain ran the show in terms of switch operation and the first officer supported him rather than as now there is a complete role reversal called PF and PM. And both change their areas of responsibility depending who is flying the plane.
It is hard to teach an old dog new tricks of course.
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