It was through Colgan/Buffalo that the more recent concerns re: training to STALL were made evident. Procedure (for an approach/STALL) was to advance throttles, and prevent altitude loss. This was trained as "maintaining back pressure", not increasing it. A loss of greater than 100 feet altitude was considered disqualifying.
And this was accepted training at low level.
Has the common perception of 447's crew STALL procedures been equated with "not losing altitude"? Has it morphed into "full back stick", with the STALL WARN activated for 54 seconds? One believes so, and what an outrageous position to 'push', absent full disclosure of all data.
At the last, when Captain suggests a Pull, ('Tire', in the French), pilot flying says, essentially, "I have been pulling back a long time already".
Without further elaboration by the investigators, this translates as an incorrect reaction to STALL. It most assuredly was not, since no recognition of STALL is demonstrated.
I suggest that leaving it at that, (as a non-response to the airframe's attitude) is grossly misleading, and infers a knowledge of the situation that either is non-existent, or, more likely, not released.
Here we bump into the most telling failure of the current "Investigatory" paradigm. With knowledge of problems in accepted procedures seemingly available, but 'hidden', they are not addressed, and the professional community is at a loss to make progress.
For fear of embarrassing an airline? An Airframer? This is unacceptable.
A profoundly important opportunity to increase knowledge and improve safety exists in the full and complete disclosure of 447's data. BEA are sitting on it. BEA make flying less than safe. It is my charge.
No, call it an accusation.