If anything Lap Sap and Lazy Gal have understated the situation - we all (crews and pax most of all) got lucky even with the incidents, maydays, and multiple diversions.
On Sunday AM the Supervisors and Watch Manager worked rather than supervised out of necessity - so at least 2 bums short for normal ops on AM shifts (APP/TMS/TMW/MCL) (one trooper off sick) - the unit is arguably not adequately staffed for normal ops - cannot open all our available and advertised positions except at expected peak periods and with Sups working and provided all turn up - anyone guess as to how the staff can ramp up in time for the new centre? It was a Sunday AM, so no office staff with ratings to call upstairs. I await some prat from the 4th floor to arrive with a new daily plan with shorter breaks to further erode morale and build fatigue.
It is very difficult to split a sector to add another sector once the workload nears or exceeds overload - all time spent on separation and talking on radio so no time to tell someone else WTF is going on - if the ATC knows what is going on by that stage - and HK does have sectors that can overload very quickly even on the best of days.
Re some comments from crews earlier about VMC holding days: just what about 40+ aircraft an hour arriving to land in Hong Kong when we have an arrival capacity of less than that do you not understand. Quart into pint pot? Unless the VHHH is forced into alternate operating procedures due to visibility well below VMC our landing rate is independent of visibility but is always dependent on wind speeds. Sorry to be harsh but this is simple apples and barrels arithmetic.
Now for our 4th floor who don’t understand: The landing rate will always be affected by the wind components on the approach opposite to the direction of landing - because landing rate is to do with time **not** distance - it takes a finite time for aircraft to vacate a runway - it takes a finite time for an aircraft to travel the distance from the point with the minimum separation from the landing aircraft ahead to the touchdown point - this depends on the ground speed from that point to touchdown - landing rate factors: distance to travel, starting ground speed, deceleration rate (option for some calculus for those who understand it), ground speed at touchdown, time to vacate. So before each day we might expect Supervisors and Flow Controllers to strategically calculate the expected possible landing rate for the expected wind and weather conditions - and then apply appropriate flow measures where possible (tricky with so many long hauls) - for those hard of thinking: the greater the wind speed on the approach the lower our landing rate. I have excluded Vref effects as this is outside of ATC control but also a factor tactically - crews, if light please warn us well before (outside 30 NM from touchdown would be good - not at 8 miles) if you get or expect a speed your aircraft cannot fly - presuming a generally “normal” or published speed of 150 to 160 KIAS at 4 NM from touchdown.
Re busy periods: if we had the staff we would open the positions late night and early morning - no staff, no open. Sector overloads are just about a **daily** occurrence and not written up as the serious incident that these are - normalization of deviance? Some periods at night still single staffing partly because of culture and partly due to not enough staff. So nothing learned from Uberlingen. New shifts are being introduced but some years late and without enough extra staff in the system. Regarding the actual shift progression shift to shift - fatigue promoting - the opposite of the recommended way to mitigate against fatigue (for those hard of thinking - shift should progress towards night shifts with progressively later starts each day and then provide adequate rest before the next cycle) - unlike things that actually are ‘rocket science’ this is not ‘rocket science’. HK ATC working hours are similar to HK Civil Service hours - too many for the job at hand in HK now - just too intense for too long.
Re holding speeds: A/C should reduce to any holding speed that suits below published max holding and if necessary increase again when leaving the hold to fit in with the traffic pattern - many HK ATC will not recognize the reasons for that because it has not been part of the culture - vectors common.
Lower speeds will save fuel (good during a delay), reduce turn radius (NM) -> reduce the actual on the day holding area (good for changing levels with other a/c near a hold) - allow greater rates of turn (deg/sec).
Contrary to an unfortunate HK ATC culture IMO - holding always better than vectors for ATC workload when appropriate (4 minutes delay or more) - although the position of a/c needs monitoring relative to the hold leaving time. Present company excepted, my experience is that crews are generally poor at hitting the hold fix at the right time when leaving the hold without help. I don't think that an FMS gets fuddled about wind direction and inbound and outbound headings so is easy for crews as well? Not sure how hard to program the FMS to hold? Most HK ATC will not fully understand rate of turn, the relationship to radius of turn, and why 25 deg bank (or less deg bank if the crew brains are offline) at 220 KIAS is not a rate one turn (if they know what that is anymore) and how long the turn will take - we should measure turns in time not miles.
Of course all that said - all main holds embedded in weather on Sunday so ad-hoc holds and orbits necessary. If the unit had kept a stock of holding a/c at TD or LIMES on Sunday art we should every day all the time - the worst may have not been so bad - holding 15 minutes or more away from the runway is dumb beyond words
Sunday: APP/FAD received many a/c at FL in the LIMES area after wx deviation (at which they may meet a VMMC arrival coming the other way) so special handling required. So for those HK ATC that don’t know yet - a/c as slow as is practical so crew will configure the a/c early resulting in much reduced turn radius (allowing S turns on base leg if necessary), steeper descent **angles** (greater altitude loss for miles across the ground), keeping crews briefed about what will happen next as it may be very different from normal ops.
All ATC on Sunday were loaded up watching for a/c busting out of adjacent sectors so in effect no level was assured without a really good look around first - a/c effectively on random routes due to the weather.
All ATC on Sunday were well outside our comfort zone - stretched even the most experienced and well exceed the experience and capabilities of others - and I am talking about uncertainty, fear and the mental paralysis that follows. The situation was changing so fast that prior co-ordination was often not possible.
I can’t speak for others but my motivation in posting is not to rubbish management (but some should go like yesterday, if not sooner, because they are clearly promoted well above their level of competence - doh! I just rubbished management!) - or expose any of us to FW fact twisting journalists of self-promoting politicians wanting to harm the careers of those they disagree with - we (the aviation professionals involved) were all lucky.
Nobody can assure any stated desired level of safety without published goals for the system as a whole and by part and transparency about actual performance. I and, I trust, HK ATC in general care deeply about ensuring HK ATC is safe, organized, and efficient. Those three concepts progress from what is most important to what is least important - **but there is a feedback loop** - inefficiency will impact organization as systems degrade and then break as they exceed capacity and capabilities - lack of organization will then impact safety as modern complex systems (A/C or ATM) only work because they are organized to work under expected stated conditions and contingencies.
Sorry for post length, too much caffeine today!