TV, a little defensive if I may say so! Perhaps it would be more constructive to learn from the report rather than just lashing out at any criticism of your great company!
Anyway, I think what frustrates the longer-established operators is that we had these accidents at least 20 years ago and consequently our Ops Manuals had reasonably robust procedures to address the issues. Which by the way is not to say that nothing was learnt from Morecombe Bay and to a lesser extent this accident.
Because we are longer-established, we have more baggage aka more overhead costs, but we consider that the extra cost is justified in terms of enhanced safety. Then along comes the brash new upstart Bond with very light experience and an immature Ops Manual, but has low overhead costs and thus can undercut BHL and CHC on many contracts. The oil companies, despite all the bluster about safety, just go for the cheapest option which is Bond. And continue to do so after an accident which is easily put down to the immaturity of the company.
That causes us frustration! But not with Bond, rather with the oil company culture where bottom line is everything!
WW - the only thing I would say about your criticism of the regulatory oversight by CAA is that its actually quite difficult for them to do much other than check for compliance with JAR-OPS, JAR-FCL etc. The nuances of such things as night offshore operating procedures are something that CAA are probably not the experts on.
But I do agree with your point that the accident was caused by the company culture, not by the individuals in the cockpit at the time.
HC