Clandestino
"Anyway, workings of Airbus AoA wane and stall warning system are relevant only in the context of theory that claims the crew which has ignored the stall warning for 54 seconds and after that canceled it's push and pulled when warning sounded again - twice, therefore showing complete inability to comprehend what was the meaning of warning or what is happening to the aeroplane, would miraculously snap out of its confused daze and suddenly react properly only if the warning didn't stop when the aeroplane was where no test pilot dared to take it before. Quite a stretch, isn't it? "
Clandestino it is not a stretch at all - and I am sure I could make you react in a similar way in a simulator where you 'totally fail to notice' something that is obvious to an outside observer. Overload a cognitive channel and NOTHING else will be processed by it. There is a famous experiment where a team of observers of a basket ball match did not notice a man in a gorilla suit on the basket ball court. Or for an aviation example a set of fighter pilots flying a 'highway in the sky' type display who on overshoot each flew through a blimp that was VERY obvious in front of their simulated aircraft. Then there was the YouTUbe video earlier in this thread showing a crew of three landing an aircraft wheels up while in the background for the entire approach the undercarriage warning horn was sounding. The examples are endless.
Unfortunately, people who disbelieve the existence of cognitive overload have been allowed to design, test and implement aircraft systems. Setting up the potential for just the type of human factors caused accident that we have seen in AF447.
This is why there is now a human factors team analyzing what happened. It would have been far better for the passengers of AF447 if the human factors analysis of what
could happen had been
before release to service