Machinbird, given quality of discussion on this thread, it seems that my attempt at trying to open meaningful discussion on how it's difficult to design, manufacture and install the AoA probe that would work accurately and reliably all throughout the modern jetliner envelope has complettely flopped. Against the arguments "I have moved it by hand easily so it must work below 60kt", "It's not rocket science", "pressure affects both of its sides" and "find an opportunity to handle one" I'm totally powerless. Quite amused, too. Still, I maintain that indignant request for AoA vane to work flawlessly far outside the flight envelope is so unrealistic as to be ludicrous. I can take some comfort form making a big, fat assumption that it stems from ignorance and not agenda.
Anyway, workings of Airbus AoA wane and stall warning system are relevant only in the context of theory that claims the crew which has ignored the stall warning for 54 seconds and after that canceled it's push and pulled when warning sounded again - twice, therefore showing complete inability to comprehend what was the meaning of warning or what is happening to the aeroplane, would miraculously snap out of its confused daze and suddenly react properly only if the warning didn't stop when the aeroplane was where no test pilot dared to take it before. Quite a stretch, isn't it?
Originally Posted by
CONF iture
Sidesticks a la sauce Airbus, is a sure path to waste very valuable information in a multi-crew operation.
The BEA has simply not the latitude to acknowledge such evidence.
Aviation accident investigation entities have obligation to reliably collect facts and analyze them as accurately as possible. Admitting someones baseless pet theories as evidence is not helpful to their aim is therefore not practiced. Moanings on anonymous forums can not be considered to be reliable evidence. Besides, delusion of vocal minority that they're representing the silent majority is as at least as old as written history itself.