Conf
Sully, and his crew, did a great job on the day. No one, least of all me, wants to take away from that. However that does not mean they did everything perfectly and so it is perfectly reasonable to look at the report and draw lessons from it. That does not amount to a personal attack on Sully. It is the NTSB that draw our attention to the issue of speed control and the effect it had. They also qualify their comments by explaining the effects of task saturation etc.
You quoted my comments re Sully rather selectively. Here is what I said
"So far from the aircraft being at fault I would say that it perhaps saved them at this stage. Sully pulled full aft stick (in order to flare) close to the stall, had it been a Boeing it may well have stalled with disasterous consequences. Of course had it been a Boeing Sully may well have chosen not to pull full aft stick."
I said "perhaps saved them" which is very different to saying did save them. It is fact that Sully pulled full aft stick close to the stall. He was trying to cushion the impact perhaps in the knowledge that he could not stall the aircraft in Normal Law. I went on to say that had it been in a Boeing he might have flown it differently.
Sully's 2 key decisions, to start the APU and to Ditch allied to his leadership and the teamwork of his crew is why they all survived. No one can take that away. However there were issues. A few quotes from the NTSB report.
Despite not reaching this portion of the Engine Dual Failure checklist, the captain stated during postaccident interviews that he thought that he had obtained green dot speed immediately after the bird strike, maintained that speed until the airplane was configured for landing, and, after deploying the flaps, maintained a speed “safely above VLS,” which is the lowest selectable airspeed providing an appropriate margin to the stall speed. However, FDR data indicated that the airplane was below green dot speed and at VLS or slightly less for most of the descent, and about 15 to 19 knots below VLS during the last 200 feet.
The NTSB concludes that the captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high AOAs, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage. (See additional discussion in section 2.7.1.)
The NTSB concludes the captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.
The airplane’s airspeed in the last 150 feet of the descent was low enough to activate the alpha-protection mode of the airplane’s fly-by-wire envelope protection features. The captain progressively pulled aft on the sidestick as the airplane descended below 100 feet, and he pulled the sidestick to its aft stop in the last 50 feet, indicating that he was attempting to raise the airplane nose to flare and soften the touchdown on the water. The A320 alpha-protection mode incorporates features that can attenuate pilot sidestick pitch inputs. Because of these features, the airplane could not reach the maximum AOA attainable in pitch normal law for the airplane weight and configuration; however, the airplane did provide maximum performance for the weight and configuration at that time.The Airbus simulation indicated that the captain’s aft sidestick inputs in the last 50 feet of the flight were attenuated, limiting the ANU response of the airplane even though about 3.5° of margin existed between the airplane’s AOA at touchdown (between 13° and 14°) and the maximum AOA for this airplane weight and configuration (17.5°). Airbus’ training curricula does not contain information on the effects of alpha-protection mode features that might affect the airplane’s response to pilot sidestick pitch inputs. The flight envelope protections allowed the captain to pull full aft on the sidestick without the risk of stalling the airplane.
14. Despite being unable to complete the Engine Dual Failure checklist, the captain started the auxiliary power unit, which improved the outcome of the ditching by ensuring that a primary source of electrical power was available to the airplane and that the airplane remained in normal law and maintained the flight envelope protections, one of which protects against a stall.
16. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high angles-of-attack, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage.
17. The captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted, in part, from high workload, stress, and task saturation.
So airspeed control was an issue.
Starting the APU played a key part in the successfull outcome
The aircraft Max Performed when asked to. Had it given him more alpha the performance wouldn't have changed and they would have been closer to the stall. Note that Airbus are only told to highlight this more in training. No where does it say that they need to change the control logic or that the aircraft failed to give maximum performance when asked. You should know that you can raise the nose more to no effect.
Had Sully been able to carry more speed into the flare, F speed or at least VLS he would have found the flare much easier in any control law.
Sorry for all the quotes but you did ask.