Nice one Caz.
WEBF wrote:
Yes, but if NATO still needed that capability after Charles De Gaulle left station NATO would have had a real problem - and the same applies in other conflicts this decade when the UK and France play a leading role. Why was it that HMS Ocean was retasked, and instead of her planned deployment or design role of amphibious operations, was sent to Libya to operate Apaches in a strike role?
From someone who was there, and saw the ATO being built:
On your first point, CDG didn't make much difference and the FAF was able to take up the slack easily with Rafales based at Solenzara (one of the furthest airfields from Benghazi) on the (surprisingly frequent) days when she didn't launch.
On your second point and IMHO, OCEA and AH were sent to the Libyan operation (after land-based air power had dealt with any possible naval threat) as a political token gesture and in a desperate attempt to get the RN and Army involved after it became clear that NGS wasn't going to make any difference either. Maybe a little harsh but difficult to point to any evidence to the contrary. I do, though, take my hat off to the AH boys, who operated very professionally and at significantly higher risk than their fixed-wing brethren. I certainly don't think anyone is going to claim that AH was a game-changer in this conflict though.