Originally Posted by Machinbird
Simple.
0200 mindfog, automation overdependence and atrophied/inadequate emergency skills resulting in failure to see the forest for the trees.
I agree. I couldn't find crew's operating history on days prior to accident. If capt and senior F/O had 24 hours layover in Rio, their clock would be still on CET and that would put the time of the accident at just past the middle of the circadian low, at 4AM. What effect on the junior F/Os body clock had the alleged R&R in Rio, remains to be seen.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
I would imagine that the Abidjan A310 accident lessons have factored into the stall warning design on the later 'Busses although It still seems possible to have a similar incorrect stall warning on the current machines.
Stall warnings gave unwarranted warnings on older types too, like
L1011 at KJFK in '92. Fortunately, outcome was less messy. Try hard as we might, we'll never make perfect and infallible stall warning system. Best we can hope for is good enough system combined with good enough crew and hope that system's and crew's low don't overlap. EK Gann understood it very well and to say that much has changed from his times would be displaying very shallow understanding of the aviation.
Originally Posted by Machinbird
Similarly, autotrim must not trim into a stall.
Hmmm.... inhibiting autotrim when stall warning is present, like it's inhibited in high speed protection? Interesting idea which might have some merit. While I currently can't think of any reason why it shouldn't be so, so far AF447 investigation has not uncovered a single reason why autotrim wouldn't work with pilots input. If pilots pushed forward, which is universally accepted as good idea when faced with upright stall, THS would follow.
Originally Posted by CONF iture
Airbus documentation is simply false.
(quote from interim3, page 20)
What a ridiculous pseudo reason really !
Those AoA vanes move at nothing. I took the opportunity to manipulate them the other day and 15kt of relative wind is probably already in excess to place them in the wind on. No wind on them, they also stay in the position you place them, like absolutely not affected by gravity.
Parbleu, monsieur! You have managed to invalidate calculations of Airbus engineurs which were accepted by certifying authorities on your own by conducting a simple manual experiment. I assume you've done it single-handedly. Congratulations... not! Do you have any idea what's the difference between dynamic pressure at 60 KEAS and 330 KEAS, everything else being identical? Only when you calculate it, we can discuss about precision and reliability of AoA vanes under all conceivable operational circumstances and whether would be too much of designers to come with those working under inconceivable ones.