Originally Posted by
rudderrudderrat
That will be all the false stall warnings received at 59 kts and below.
Check HazelNuts39's very important point above. Stall warning inhibition is not a direct outcome of the logic, it is
a side-effect of the logic that says AoA data is unreliable. Put simply, the logic does not say "if airspeed < 60kts, inhibit stall warning", it says "if airspeed < 60kts then AoA data is unreliable". So already the scope for positive effects from the logic has increased (whenever AoA vanes have headed south due to contamination/mechanical failure in the past, for example).
Up until this incident happened, I think most would agree that the chances of an airliner stalling so comprehensively from cruise that it did actually reach the point where AoA data could become invalid were suitably remote, and that this logical side-effect would pose no threat to flight safety. Now it has been proven that it *is* possible, the logic needs looking at.