Originally Posted by
rudderrudderrat
Hi DozyWannabe,
The two co-pilots didn't hear / recognise / believe / admit (any of those) the stall and insisted on applying TOGA 15 degs pitch throughout the stall warning.
That would appear to be the case based on what we know so far - though it certainly doesn't look like the PNF agreed with the PF's decision based on the CVR traces.
When the Captain arrived on the flight deck, the stall warning ceased because IAS<60 kts. If it had continued - then maybe he would have diagnosed the problem correctly.
Well, it was sounding for a few seconds after he arrived and it's probable that he heard it through the flight deck door for some time before he arrived - so while your point is valid, I don't think that deriving "woulda-coulda-shoulda" points is helpful in this case. It's definitely not a positive factor in the stall warning design logic, but you have to ask yourself whether the logic was reasonable given the knowledge and state-of-the-art at the time. This was, after all, the first time that anything of this nature had happened. As it is, the Captain was summoned from trying to get to sleep, so it's probably fair to say that his faculties weren't at their best.
To prevent a similar accident, is your solution to simply change the crew?
Not at all - frankly I find it quite saddening when people say that I'm trying to "blame the crew" and leave it at that.
Edit. Please explain how you think it is possible for a heavy aircraft to be airborne, yet travel through the air with a speed <60 kts.
I don't think it'd be easy or desirable - and I think that's probably why the systems were designed the way they were - for the very reason that it is so unlikely.
And ironically that was due to a software logic error in the 744's systems that had never reared its head until that moment.