@gums, RRR, Ian W:
I don't think the <60kts in this case was intended to be tied in with ground mode - I suspect it was designed to cover another potentially false stall warning trigger. Remember that one of the main reasons pilots have ignored stall warnings in the past was because they were perceived as unreliable. If I was designing the system I'd have to weigh up the probability of a false stall warning triggering due to UAS causing an inappropriate response by the systems or the crew against the probability of the aircraft ever actually getting that slow in flight, which as logical people you have to admit is considerably higher in the case of the former than the latter. The problem we have now is that while the probability of the latter is low, it has in fact happened and now the design and logic path must be looked at from the ground up. As engineers will tell you, knee-jerk changes to design in order to react to a single failure mode are a bad move in general - one must be absolutely sure that the change has no knock-on effect.
@jcj - With all due respect, what does that have to do with this incident? The post you quote I don't think has to do with any logic change deriving from that accident (or the incident that preceded it), which in that case seemed to have been caused by a diligent attempt to slow down as much as possible in bad weather and use an old (more effective) procedure for engaging reversers - leading to the error the new (slightly less effective) procedure was designed to prevent.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 8th Sep 2011 at 23:05.