Originally Posted by Ventus45
Isn't it funny how unthinking knee jerk reactions to surprise or sudden onset situations are generally not considered to be a good idea in human responses, but are allowed, indeed, mandated, by both policy and design, in computer control systems, especially those supposedly intended to protect those humans from their perceived failings.
The evidence, at high energy altitude at least, is starting to add up to: "The cure is worse than the disease".
Humour is a matter of personal preference, yet I must state that I find your excellent example of
straw man argument not particularly funny.
If definition of knee jerk includes "quick, large, fast, precise, with positive feedback loop", then knee jerk reactions are required while flying in extreme circumstances, such as when one is getting cornered and prompt resolution is required, e.g. stall warning, GPWS maneuver, windshear escape. If not, forget about it at all. Whether my proposition of knee-jerk definition stands or not, UAS wouldn't call for knee-jerk reaction even in your wildest dreams.
Can we agree that half back stick, progressing to full was unwarranted and maladjusted knee jerk reaction to UAS that untimely terminated the lifespans of AF447 crew and passengers or are we going to attack the BEA's findings, so far?
Do you have a slightest idea what effects your cure has, when you pronounce it worse than disease or are you disregarding them and are just into concentrating on side effects?
Originally Posted by Ian W
However, at each stage right down at low levels in the system assumptions are made.
For example: "No aircraft will be airborne if its speed is less than 60 Kts as read from the pitot tubes".
That the aeroplane with size and weight of A330, at 60 KIAS will be soaring through the air with grace and elegance of falling refrigerator and that therefore her airborne time at said speed will be most cruelly limited is not just an assumption. It's a fact.
Originally Posted by xcitation
PF was not to be aware of his climb to max altitude due to his stick back.
He could have checked attitude and altitude. I am puzzled why he didn't.
Originally Posted by RatherBeFlying"
I am sure that the engineers were thoroughly conscientious, but it definitely looks that the pilots did not know what airplane they were trying to fly -- well the word Alternate was pronounced, but there was no learned disquisition in the cockpit on the implications of Alt 2B, even though I am sure the committee of engineers spent several days talking it over.
Brief summary of flight controls effects in Alt 2B, provided the aeroplane stays within flight envelope:
STICK FORWARD ........................................ NOSE DOWN
STICK AFT ................................................ NOSE UP
STICK LEFT ............................................... ROLL LEFT
STICK RIGHT ............................................. ROLL RIGHT
PEDALS LEFT ............................................. YAW LEFT
PEDALS RIGHT ........................................... YAW RIGHT
Ladies & gentlemen, aren't you forgetting the basics of instrument flying? Namely that successful instrument flying absolutely requires: idea where is aeroplane, where we want it to be and strong positive feedback loop between pilots actions and aeroplane reactions? Aeroplane banks and I don't want that? Give opposite command via stick, yoke, ram horn yoke, whatever happens to be in your hand at the time. How much is enough? 5, 15 or 30° ? Who cares, effects on the aeroplane can be easily read on AH, outside horizon or deducted from turn & bank, if you're going on partial panel and that's what guides pilots hand. Or at least those pilots that can be truly considerd to be proficient in instrument flying.
Considering the matter of untimely activation of alpha prot in normal law, mentioned here and having no relevance on AF447
AFAIK: while I admit I would prefer having its activation clearly anounced, it's not a such big deal. It pitches the aeroplane up mighty quickly but it gets disconnected by pushing the stick forward - which is what you'd be doing anyway if you're unhappy with aeroplane climbing on her own. Sitting, watching the pitch and altimeter go up and comenting " Ehhhh... what eez eet doing now?" is not likely to help.
Retired F4 and his former tactical fighter pilots colleagues have repeatedly mentioned "unloading the wing". Civilian equivalent of this is "PUSH FOR CONTROL" and is sadly neglected in training. Idea behind this is that when faced with loss of control of the unknown origin, most probably it is stall induced, so reduce AoA.