Lyman
See that you are back!
From the BEA Interim Report #3:
The bold depicted is my addition.
At 2 h 10 min 05, the sudden drop in the measured airspeeds, likely due to the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals, caused autopilot and autothrust disconnection (the thrust was then locked) and the change in the flight control law from normal to alternate. The presence of turbulence, shown by the inputs by the AP to control the roll in the previous seconds, led on disconnection to the airplane beginning a roll to the right of up to about 8°.
The PF copilot said “I have the controls” and made rapid and high amplitude lateral, almost stop to stop, inputs. He also made a nose-up input that increased the airplane’s pitch attitude up to 11° in ten seconds. The Flight Directors were not disengaged by the crew, but the crossbars disappeared.
At 2 h 10 min 10, the PF’s nose-up inputs increased the angle of attack and the stall warning triggered twice transitorily. Probably in reaction to this warning, the PNF exclaimed “what is that?”. The PF then said “We haven’t got good ... We haven’t got a good display ... of speed” and the PNF “We’ve lost the speeds”. The angle of attack recorded was around 5°, for a theoretical stall warning threshold trigger value of slightly over 4°.
The crew identified the loss of the speed displays but neither of the two copilots called out the associated procedure. The “Unreliable IAS” emergency manoeuvre requires as a first step to disconnect the automatic flight controls and disengage the Flight Directors. The two copilots had only been trained for the emergency manoeuvre at lower levels, in the course of which the pitch attitude to adopt is 10° or 15°.
However, an OSV note described the problems of the loss of speed indications up to then on the A330/A340 fleet in cruise and recalled the procedures to apply. This note had been distributed to all the flight crew in the A330/A340 division.
Between 2 h 10 min 18 and 2 h 10 min 25, the PNF read the ECAM messages in a disordered way but mentioned the loss of autothrust and the change to alternate law. The thrust lock function was de-activated. The PNF called out and triggered the wing anti-icing.
The PNF then drew the PF’s attention to the speed. At that moment, the two recorded speeds (the one displayed on the left on the PFD and that on the ISIS) were below 100 kt and the vertical speed reached a maximum of 7,000 ft/min. The airplane’s longitudinal movements resulted from the inputs by the PF, who in addition continued to make high amplitude lateral inputs to control the roll, below 10° to the right and to the left.
Reading the three instruments (the two PFD’s and the ISIS), the PNF noticed that the airplane was climbing and asked the PF several times to descend. The latter then made several nose-down inputs that resulted in a reduction in the pitch attitude and the vertical speed, whose values nevertheless still remained excessive; the airplane then being near 37,000 ft and continuing to climb, without any intervention from the PNF. Although the REC MAX had been a permanent preoccupation before the AP disconnection, neither of the two copilots made any reference to it.
At around 2 h 10 min 34, the speed displayed on the left side became valid again and was then 215 kt; the speed on the ISIS was still incorrect. The airplane had then lost about 60 kt since the autopilot disconnection and the beginning of the climb, which is consistent with the increase in altitude of around 2,000 ft.
Now from your post:
Have you considered the exclamation may be in response to BUFFET?
That would mean the PNF reacts to BUFFET, then STALLWARN sounds, (w/o cricket).
My point is that puravida has the exclamation prior to SV STALL.....
Of course the best, but still inconclusive, is that the exclamation post dates the STALL, but without excluding the possibility he was reacting to BUFFET, or some other artifact on the CVR.
BEA will do what they have to do, but without a complete, fully transcribed and indexed CVR, whatever conclusion they publish will not be ironclad, v/v the CVR.
There is an additional possibility from the French:
"What is that?.......THAT!!" As if he may be pointing to something and for emphasis, "SEE, THIS!"....... Or, he may be pointing to his ear, ("you hear?") etc......
Now, if one believes in reincarnation, I would think you were a very good defense lawyer in your prior life. The points you raise and the questions you ask are very typical of that a defense lawyer would pose to a jury to hopefully instill doubt or confusion to facts presented during the proceedings. The BEA is giving the pilots some slack by mentioning their lack of formal training at high speeds and altitudes and left some room at this point as to the "What was that?" comment by the use of the word "probably". But, they have the tapes, the recorded verbal exchanges and the verbal timing sequences to other recorded data. If these details don't come out in the final report, it will in the legal process as all the data belongs to the French Legal Organization.
As to the technical aspects of the actual airplane, that is something to be debated by the Airbus pilots and Airbus, the manufacturer. Hopefully this debate will lead to smart, well thought out improvements to bring flight safety to a higher level. When you think of the number of commercial aircraft, all makes and models, in the air at any given time, 24, 7, 365, the safety is really very good, but there is always room to improve as it is not 100%, but not far off.