Originally Posted by
Zorin_75
Whatever the other crews did - they didn't point the nose into orbit a couple of seconds and kept it there for minutes after they had to start flying their plane themselves.
Agreed, of course
The point I was trying to make, is that to lump the other 32 UAS together as some kind of non-events, and not the near disasaters which some could have been due to poor / incorrect handling in some cases (e.g. re-engaging A/P immediately after the disconnection, not recognising that it was a UAS at all etc.) is ignoring that
some of them could have turned out differently IMHO.
As I agreed above, other crews didn't make the
same major mistake as AF447 which you mention, but potentially disasterous mistakes in handling some other UAS events
were made, as described in the report. That none of those resulted in crashes does have an element of luck IMHO (swiss cheese model).
Or to put it another way - I doubt that the AF447 crew were the only crew at that time, with the same lack of training/practice in handling/recognising UAS and hand-flying at cruise altitudes. If one of the other crews mentioned in the report, who didn't handle
their one of the 32 other UAS well, had been in the AF447 situation at
that height, time of day, flight deck situation (2 x F/O) etc. etc., would they have done better? I wouldn't bet on it. That's all I'm saying.