I know some people want it to be about the sidestick, autotrim and lack of feedback but the odds are stacking up against it.
I don't think you should polarise this so much
Few, if any, are denying that PF was way below par from manual takeover to end of story... with general crew shortcomings becoming apparent.
But really, you have to stop this black and white routine, any engineer will tell you very few solutions, much in nature and certainly not accidents are so black & white
All those 3 things did play
some part (notwithstanding similar accidents in the past happening without them - that is a false negative), I believe.
To start slamming a control column about like that (
just think of the equivalent), would definitely have woken up the Captain upon entry, even if PNF had still stayed subdued (this accident will no doubt turn into a study case for at least pilot shock & stress behaviour as much as CRM itself).
Indeed, AF should be consulting the RAF crew selection centre (as was) about some help?
There is almost no argument that Captain would not have responded to visually seeing a full aft stick in PFs hands - end of.
No doubt he would then have looked straight at the Trimwheel, and PFD
My guess Captain had no idea that PF (had been and) was still obsessed with an UP/ DOWN mentality, and at night, was totally removed from any sense of wind over wings and AoA (something even crude Q-pot feedback could provide)
I think PF having flown sailplanes is very much a red herring.. he was no Sully.
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