Sometimes even poorly presented and what many would consider to be extreme points of view contain elements of truth hidden beneath the hyperbole and histrionics. I'll attempt to find some nuggets of wisdom in WRH's last post.
You would have given your seats up like the first three 9/11 crews...
Galaxy Flyer addressed this point already, but I'll add that while government and airline policy directives promoted "cooperation" with hijackers right up until that day, not every airline pilot planned to "blindly" comply. Even so, none of these crews had any reason to suspect the hijackers ultimate intent at the time the airplanes were taken. Prior to that, most hijackings were perceived to be for the purpose of hostage taking for some form of ransom. This perception was apparently a key element of the terrorist's plan. Had these crews known what their ultimate plan was, well let's just say they might have reacted differently. They would now.
I find the question asked to be an irrelevancy and a poorly selected example case to use in an argument apparently intended to promote pilot discretion and critical thinking during an abnormal event. Not much wisdom here.
You would have gone through the fuel dump procedure, rather then get it down in Nova Scotia..
Who knows? We weren't there and we're not sure what information would have been available to us if we were. But I'm reasonably sure that in-flight fires and electrical shorts are something
most pilots would consider a higher priority than meeting landing weight limitations. Then and now.
This accident does drive home the point that proper prioritization of objectives is a command function. I think it always was.
You would have continued with a fire light on the Concorde..
I don't know enough about the details of what the flightcrew knew at what time to say. But in this airplane especially, a high speed abort from above V1 with failed tires and fuel pouring out doesn't seem likely to have produced a better result.
Again. maybe not the most applicable case to cite.
You would have sat up there on the phone messing with the trim while jack screw got worse and worse and worse...
This one I can find some agreement with in large part. No I would
not. Not then, now or ever. But then I am an experienced mechanic in addition to to my piloting background. I've worked on similar stab trim systems and know/knew what this set of symptoms imply. The company mx controllers and others in the company should have too. While the flightcrew thought they were doing the right thing, there was information to the contrary readily available to the mx dept. This information was NOT made available to the crew. For those willing to spend many hours researching this whole affair, the full story is a stinging indictment of a company cost savings plan gone wrong and a series of what I believe to be reprehensible management actions.
Considering what the crew could have reasonably be expected to know and do given their qualification as pilots, the blame rests squarely on the company. Though some individuals like myself had knowledge beyond the scope of what might normally be expected of flightcrew, that does
not serve as an indictment of this crew's following of the direction provided to them by their company, who they might well have reasonably believed knew more than they.
Overall, another poor example even though there is
some truth in the argument.
Your 'I don't think, I do what I am told' approach to aviation is a credit to all the airline chief pilots who have specifically culled any independent reasoning ability out of it's ranks.
Do I detect a slight hint of contempt for authority figures here?
Well that's understandable. Particularly in today's aviation business environment. Still, it's not an attitude one wants to become widely known for. Perhaps many pilots have made a conscious decision that it's better to question authority more quietly, in a way that doesn't needlessly expose them to unwanted managerial scrutiny. Seems kinda spineless? Such is life in the modern corporate machine. Get used to it, cuz it's here to stay. But that doesn't mean one has to do something they
know to be wrong. In real conditions of duress, you may find your fellow pilots to be less sheeplike than you seem to believe. However I have to opine that one would be well advised to reserve acting contrary to SOP or accepted policy for situations where the "accepted" or conventional action is either clearly inappropriate or inapplicable to the circumstances. None of the above examples clearly pass the test. Maybe a better example?
So bringing this back to the subject rejecting a takeoff after having accelerated beyond V1.
Of course we can think of circumstances when the potential consequences of aborting beyond V1 might be preferable to the consequences of continuing the takeoff. Under a "system approach" to the problem, statistical analysis will be a large component of any policy promulgated by airlines, manufacturers or regulators. As the commander of an airplane, your obligation is to do whatever is necessary to preserve the safety of your flight. It may come to pass that doing so requires a departure from regs, policies or established procedures. If so, your every move might later come into question. If you're wrong there may be consequences of a professional, legal or mortal nature. This is what you accept every time you sit down in the cockpit. Rules, procedures and policies define the framework for your operations. It is recognized that operating outside the framework may become necessary under certain circumstances. Better make sure you're right when you do.
Just wanted to let you know: We're all counting on you!
