Taking your cheese holes a bit further, I would submit that any hole plugged before STALL makes improvements in STALL recovery rather a Red Herring. Nice, but doesn't obtain.
The hole to which I refer is the hole of Dependence on auto flight.
More specifically, a lack of preparation to address known possibilities for critical handling problems.
Dependence leading to disastrous initial mismanagement, highlighting a glaring insufficiency of Leadership on the Flight deck.
For me, it would be sufficient to address the procuring cause: the lack of skills in emergent situations, well ahead of Departure. (STALL, not push back).
This STALL, UA, etc, "Training" thing, sorry, is a ruse. Because what you want is more Rote drill, and SOPS; a track I predict further cements the problem in 'insolubility'.
PJ2 concludes the accident "began with the initial NOSE UP." That is not established at all, as he is in discussion with others whether "handling at drop" is indicated, or not. And that whether 2.5 or 5.0! By drill!
The STALL lacked conventional (!) cues, and "Recogniton of Approach to STALL" is well addressed in SIM; there is no evidence we should be supplying cadets with Schweizers, and spin training.
The shortfall is in Situational awareness, and that is not easy to expect, operationally, and given the aforementioned dependence on its hypnotic nemesis: Autoflight. imho.
Proviso. The Dependence to which I refer, is not flightcrews'. Crew are prevented from any reasonable solution to this dangerous dependence, and as I have pointed out: The PILOT GROUP DOES NOT SELF TRAIN.
READ: AIRBUS, AIR FRANCE.
Last edited by Lyman; 28th Aug 2011 at 03:51.