Firstly, given there are >3300 replies here, I have not read them all. I'm picking up on the confusion caused by reducing attitude and a stall warning sounding, and then hauling nthe nose back into a stall with no warning going off. There have been various accidents where pitot or static vents were blocked, ADC's malfunctioning or ADI's freezing. In many of them there was height and thus time to spare. There was significnat confusion and matters made worse because the crew did what they normally did in decyphering the instrument information. From TV reconstructions of the incidents at no time did anyone stop and say "this can not be correct. My aviation training and gut feeling tells me this is wrong. The laws of physics and aviation have not suddenly changed. So lets go back to basics and find out what is really going on." e.g. inputting nose down elevator in +ve G flight does not cause the altimeter to show a climb or speed to reduce: reducing attitude does not cause an a/c to stall. Something in all the electronic wizardry is scrambled; the computers speak with forked tongue. Let's pause and use our knowledge to find a safe place and then analyse what we know and what we see. There is time and there are other sources of information for us to consider to resolve the apparent confusion and false information.
How we introduce this philosophy into training is a big question, but if it had been there in many of the fatal accidents perhaps they would have been survivable. In all the cases I've seen, and am thinking about, the a/c was flying and controlable. It was the pilots, presented with incorrect performance parameters, who crashed the a/c. I know this sounds easy sitting in the arm chair. Would we have acted so calm in the reality? I don't know, but I believe it can only be helpful to introduce some of these scenarios in recurrent training. Every 3 years in recurrent training we are supposed to tick the 'flight instruments' box. I have never been given such a scenario, only a very simple unreliable airspeed problem, which was not flown to a landing, or another simple problem. When I wrote recurrent training programs I searched the real crash causes and included them in the syllabus. The crews often knew of the crash and were intrigued to learn from them, practically, not just reading the reports. There was real purpose in the training, not just box ticking. Sadly, it is no longer in my remit. Do others have any useful training experiences which could help with this dilema?