AF447 wreckage found

[Welsh Wingman]

Mr Optimistic

The PNF in the LHS, when the A/P disconnected, could well have been asleep until sometime between 1H 55 and 2H into the flight. The A/P disconnects at 2H 10 05, the stall alarm sounds at 2H 10 10 and the PNF is "not happy" by 2H 10 27 and starts "nagging" the junior F/O P/F and PIC re: airspeed and altitude.

By 2H 10 49, 2 seconds before the stall alarm triggers again, he is anxious over the failure of the CDB to return to the cockpit, but does not take the controls until 2H 11 38 (maximum height was at 2H 11 10), and then "relinquishes" control as the CDB enters the cockpit 5 seconds later (and the stall alarm ceases a further 2 seconds later due to the AoA design issue). AF447 hits the ocean at 2H 14 26.

All over - 4 minutes 21 seconds from start to finish, with maximum altitude reached 1 minute and 5 seconds after the A/P disconnect.

I can see little in the CVR (admittedly little has been disclosed to date) to suggest that the PF would have saved the aircraft under any system. He had experience, in addition to his training, working against him. My yoke/SS debate with DozyWannabe, or rather our feedback debate, is under what circumstances, or under what amended system (if any), the PNF might have been induced to take control and assume the PF role in the first 30-60 seconds and stabilise the flight through P+P (alternatively, been in a better position to brief the returning CDB - albeit it was a rapidly worsening scenario by that stage, stalled and falling). Irrespective of AF procedures, he had the ultimate incentive. Additionally, in the interests of wider airline safety, another PNF in such a scenario (however widely you define "scenario").

One critical point to consider - better feedback from the aircraft and something more direct than another alarm or FMC screen i.e. seeing clearly what the PF was doing with his RHS SS, plus what was happening to thrust and trim. To what is the aircraft responding? Once the VSI is hurtling downwards, more difficult but enough for the CDB/PNF to diagnose the stall (despite the on/off stall alarm confusing them, with no AoA indicator/BUSS). My own view is that the CDB did not take the LHS because he wanted to step back and get an overview of what had happened (other than the aircraft "had gone mad" - my words, not from the BEA report).