Originally Posted by
Welsh Wingman
...I interpreted his comparison between the crashes as limited to the similarities between the instant discomfort of the PF upon losing his automation. I don't think that was a happy cockpit from the A/P disconnect, and the roll oscillations weren't long in coming....
The Air Inter captain never entirely lost his automation, just his pre-programmed approach. He never got as far as having to manually control the aircraft, instead following the radar vectors and initiating descent via FMC input.
DozyWannabe - but you raise a point that TJHarwood appears to have overlooked i.e. PNF "nagging". Wasn't the PNF in 1992 concerned about the PF's positional shortcomings (sadly horizontal, not vertical) in much the same way as the AF447 PNF was concerned about the PF's inputs and the climb? Good point re: disconnect between pilots on both occasions.
Thanks! So - if I recall correctly - yes, the Captain started to say something to the effect of the altitude or V/S not looking right, and in an unfortunate coincidence, at the exact same time the F/O interjected to point out that the display had them to the left of the airfield (which was due to ATC turning them onto final prematurely), which then preoccupied both pilots (in much the same way that an unfortunately-timed radio transmission distracted the Kegworth Captain as he began to re-evaluate the symptoms).
And whatever one think about an AoA indicator or BUSS as an option, I think we can all agree that a GPWS should never be optional (whatever SNCF's TGV competition).
Of course, with 20/20 hindsight!
Human factors, and that must focus on the interface and training. Automation, properly used i.e. "airmanship plus".
No argument from me there!
@CJ : I think the first modern sidestick came with the Mercury project at NASA.
