I believe that Lyman was trying to say somewhat less than concisely, was that with the aircraft established in the stall and dropping at over 100 kts, that the g could have been less than .75g leading to the THS software logic locking in position.
or to put it another way
If the software driving the THS uses g sensimg
and moves the THS with the intent of maintaining 1 g then
0.9 g would be enough for the software to continue commanding full NU.
Most of which is factually incorrect, particularly the 0.75 value, which
should read 0.5, a value the aircraft
NEVER achieved.
For once an for all, the THS
followed the PF demand applied for NU. Once the elevators were consistently held NU the integrating function that looks at the demand, determined a constant NU offset was being applied to the controls and followed the demand in an attempt to off-load the elevator (as designed, trim, hello!). I don't know what else to say? The PF asked for NU, the system delivered. The PF also decided that TO/GA was a good idea, again assisting in NU.
BTW - Owain Glyndwr - nice work, helps understand things and also reaffirms the point that the THS was NOT the 500lb gorilla in the room here. The elevator demand alone was enough to put the aircraft in the ocean.
I can't help but equate the THS sysetem to the power steering assistance on most cars - yes, if you turn the wheel to point the car over the edge of the precipice the car will dive over the edge to it's doom, the power steering just makes it
less hard to do the pointing, but over you will go, whether the power steering works or not, if that is where you point the car in the first place. In fact the THS is LESS intrusive than the power steering analogy, but you get my point...