Hi
Originally Posted by
Clandestino
Procedure that required setting 5°/CLB by heart was in force at the time of the accident. Page 59 of interim 3 report in English refers.
That procedure seems to have been badly phrased, as there are so many questions about it.
Anyway, I think the way its writer intended it, it was :
-
if there is a danger for the flight safety => apply memory items (which is as you quoted is, 5°/CLB), then refer to QRH for the "fine tuned" attitude/thrust to apply, then manage the failure.
-
if there is no danger => refer to QRH, no immediate action (i.e. implicitly, fly ahead until you know which pitch & thrust to apply), then apply it, then manage the failure.
In AF447's case, there was IMO no danger. This would explain why, as soon as june 2009, AF published a note "reminding" to its crews that they were
not to apply the memory items
in high altitude cruise.
For the rest (i.e. is or isn't 5°/CLB "dangerous" and/or will it or not trigger the stall warning in HA cruise), I have no clue and won't comment.