It indicates a major chasm in AF training - and I fear probably across other AB companies too.
Even after the stall manifested by the rapid heading change (bank attitude) and the sudden descent, the FLIGHT CREW FAILED TO RECOGNIZE the problem for a number of seconds. THEY CONTINUED TO APPLY BACK PRESSURE ON THE CONTROL COLUMN WHICH KEPT THE AIRCRAFT AT A HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK.
Boeing 727 Accident Conclusions:
The aircraft accumulated sufficient ice during its flight to block the drain holes and total pressure inlet ports. Static ports were not affected.
The flightcrew misconstrued the operation of the stall warning STICK SHAKER as mach buffet.
The flightcrew continued to increase the nose up attitude of the aircraft following the operation of the stick shaker
Following the stall the aircraft entered into a right spiralling dive at a high rate of descent. Throughout the descent the flightcrew reacted primarily to airspeed and rate of descent indications instead of attitude indications and this failed to initiate recovery techniques and procedures.
In an effort to recover the aircraft from the high rate of descent the flightcrew exerted excessive pull forces on the control column.
CAUSE:
The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the loss of control of the aircraft because the flightcrew failed to recognize and correct the aircraft high angle of attack and low speed stall. The stall was precipitated by the flightcrews improper reaction to erroneous airspeed and mach indications which had resulted from a blockage of the pitot heads by atmospheric ice.
Sound familiar. Now perhaps BOAC when you reread Aeroperu, Birginair and several others, you could perhaps expand on your fear that this is something to do with airbus.
The truth hurts but you need to look closer to home for this one. It is the mark I human being at fault, nothing else.