I have received quite a number of PM's in relation to the Accident Table, some in appreciation for helping bring the 139's accident history into perspective, others offering caution over the potential misinterpretations which could arise from such a list.
I have also been invited to redefine the Basic Cause for a number of the accidents and which recommendations I have embraced without exception. The Table is therefore a collaborative effort among those members of Rotorheads who have tendered useful information for the purpose of enhancing its accuracy.
The recent flurry of 139 accidents has caused concern, especially among the unlearned, over the type's technical reliability but one thing I believe the Table has done is to highlight the number of 'human error' components which have been present in many of these episodes.
A point firmly driven home in one adeptly written PM I received, highlighted the technical complexity of the 139 stating:
"A ten day factory course is not nearly enough the LEARN this airframe. It is highly complex. The learning curve is a straight line upwards. I have been involved in the 139 for five years now, I learn something different every day I sit in that chair, I fly it with confidence armed with knowledge. I have taught myself well, am I an expert? Not hardly."
And also:
"The pilots are flying two main computers, that monitor every aspect of the aircraft, the software programs are complex and no one knows with certainty EXACTLY what happens when moving a switch or pushing a button. There are so many things that are not taught at the factory school. All information on the Agusta 139 is propriatory in nature."
And again:
"I fear there may yet be more "pilot error" accidents on this airframe. Prime cause, insufficient training, either lack of because the cost is prohibitive, or due to a risk matrix in which management personnel are making poor decisions, because the "numbers" are not aligned."
I think if anything the Table has (for me) highlighted the fact that the 139 is an aircraft which demands 'diligent operation' in that it would appear that some of the craft's systems represent a departure from 'the norm' (ie. the operation of less sophisticated aircraft) and therefore, for some, a step change from their existing experience.
I have received conflicting information over the Hong Kong incident. There is a post confirming FOD on or around the tail and I have PM's stating that this was a TRGB failure totally unrelated to any external influence - we will have to wait and see; as indeed is the case with the more recent accidents.
I still have no information whatsoever on the South Korean accident.
Herewith is the up-dated Table taking into account the unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Spanish tragedy:
