2 x P1::2 x P2
Apropo nothing other than a feeling of general uneasiness regarding operational standards . . .
Years ago I was the only F/O on a series of extended-endurance supply runs (on L-188), rostered with two Capts and a very young me. We rotated on route. I can still recall my complete awe at being dumped in the skippers seat on first crew-change ex-dept on the first trip. The wonderment, the confusion, the uncertainty as to who was in command. (He, the 2IC minor-god in the F/O's seat was that, of course, but it wasn't spelled out), and, it being after a hasty line training period, the daze I felt myself in, and my eventual engagement for that bit of the trip with the flight engineer (yup) on the details and ramifications of the 7 prop-stops used on that type. But no empathy for the aircraft, or the task.
I can relate too well with the so-low time P2 (P3?) in the F/O's seat. The grip on the stick would have been . . .
With an enquiry in place I think I had better stop here, other than to say that, with 2 skippers, the situation we have tried to deconstruct here for so many months, and which those in AF447 had just 3-odd minutes to resolve, would most likely have been handled otherwise with just one high-time driver at hand, and that in the end I suspect this will be another result similar to the ANZ Antarctic prang, which fundamentally resolved to management disassociation from operational considerations.
<i>(minor typo corrections)(/i>