@ airtren : You're welcome, Sir.
Please note the THS logic in
normal law (from the FCOM):
Automatic pitch trim is frozen in the following cases:
- manual trim order
- radio altitude below 100ft for flare
- load factor lower than 0.5 g
- in high speed protection
When angle of attack protection is active, THS is limited between setting at entry in protection and 2° nose down (i.e. further nose up trim cannot be applied).
Similarly, when the load factor is higher than 1.3 g, or when the bank angle gets outside +/- 33°, the THS is limited between the actual setting and 2° nose down.
NB : 2° ND is max position ND of the THS.
So basically, the idea I proposed is already the way Airbus'logic deals with the THS in Normal law. Let's do the same in Alternate law.
I do agree it won't have helped in other cases (i.e. Perpignan D-AXLA), but for the latter, 10" after the stall warning the aircraft go to Direct law for ~25" (then Alt law for the last 25" of flight) ; let's remind that in Direct law, there is no auto-trim (USE MAN PITCH TRIM) = no return to neutral for those 25" either, if we follow your proposed logic, then no help either.
Originally Posted by
Lyman
ROLL is DIRECT, RUDDER is DIRECT, but PITCH is NOT DIRECT, and it is UNPROTECTED.
Wrong, think
g protection, still active in ALT2 (pitch is not direct, but it is protected)
Also, yaw (rudder) is not direct in ALT2 either, damping & compensation are provided. See the FCOM.
Originally Posted by
Lyman
If the TRIM is active, it absolutely compromises the elevators' authority.
Not under 180kt.
Or are you advocating for a trim free aircraft? I agree with Clandestino on #181.
Originally Posted by
Lyman
If ACTIVE, it is also sluggish (behind), and the Pilot must form a different response to variable combinations of TRIM/ELEVATOR, which he cannot see, feel, or "hear".
Wrong. See my previous post. One can see where the THS is.
Originally Posted by
rudderrudderrat
@AlphaZuluRomeo,
The IAS was grossly under reading. The acute angle of attack to the pitot tubes rendered them useless. The fact that the aircraft is airborne should be sufficient logic to maintain stall warnings and Angle of Attack.
Yes, I'm aware of that, airspeed was more in the 100kt range.
But the AoA remains unreliable under a (real) airspeed of 60kt. Then isn't having movable pitot probes a better solution than to remove the 60kt limit? Such probes exists, see the Rafale for example (one probe for AoA & pitot).