A33Zab,
Originally Posted by
A33Zab
.
One can say there is a design flaw or not smart enough systems during the design phase or after the first years of operation (like DC10 aft cargodoor).
But not after so many years of operation, by then there are other issues,
and that may be clear to all of us by now.
The better understanding of possible problems later in the life of a complex system is somewhat contradictory with discounting the possibility of uncovering flaws later in the life of such a complex system. The latter calls for some reminders:
- the probability of uncovering all flaws/shortcomings/bugs during tests, or in the first year or years of operation of a system, is decreasing with the complexity of the system.
- a shortcoming may stay hidden for a good amount of time, as long as its hosting path in the system's algorithms is not operated, or fully operated - the type of AF 447 Stall is not happening often.
Isn't there room for technical improvements?
Yes off course there is, but not tactile feedback (which is of no use in FBW) or introduce other protections (THS inhibit at high AoA) because there you ask for other problems.
Can you elaborate on "THS inhibit at high AOA", in terms of description, and the problems incurred? I am not sure if you refer to the elements that were the object of several earlier posts on this thread, but either way, elaborating would be helpful, and would be appreciated.
A. already made changes to AoA BEFORE this event and offered this as option. 'BUSS'
Svoice 'STALL STALL' would have sounded until impact.
Are there any reasons for the BUSS not to have been adopted? particularly for a route that has a higher risk? like the AF 447's?