This 3rd report is an interim report like the 1st and 2nd report.
You need to read al reports!, some questions you have are already answered in the previous reports.
after the, so far unexplained, FBW malfunction
Nothing to explain here, there wasn't a FBW malfunction.
and smarter design are solutions for a better flight safety
but what if a smart design is not understood and not properly used by the user? like AF477.
One can say there is a design flaw or not smart enough systems during the design phase or after the first years of operation (like DC10 aft cargodoor).
But not after so many years of operation, by then there are other issues,
and that may be clear to all of us by now.
Pilot error due lack of training, absence of CRM and TEM.
Isn't there room for technical improvements?
Yes off course there is, but not tactile feedback (which is of no use in FBW) or introduce other protections (THS inhibit at high AoA) because there you ask for other problems.
A. already made changes to AoA BEFORE this event and offered this as option. 'BUSS'
Svoice 'STALL STALL' would have sounded until impact.
Would this have prevented this accident?
proberly not because it wasn't understood in the 54s it was present!
AF (like most operators) didn't opt for that mod because there wasn't a reason to do so before.
Now things have changed and this 'BUSS' option may become standard (like it is on A380 and will be on A350).