Tourist
I think Chug makes a good point. If I were a pilot, I think I'd like to carry out my personal risk assessment from a position of knowledge, and confidence that those who were meant to provide me with safe kit were doing their job: something I appreciate you have to rather assume.
Chinook ZD576 will now always be held up as the classic example. The aircrew were not informed that the entire Nav and Comms systems only had Switch On clearance ("mandated" according to Lord Philip). The pilots instinctively knew there were major issues but couldn't pinpoint the precise problem. When they sought a Mk1, the officer who refused was similarly constrained. What would he have said or done had he known? In fact, who knew this? CA and his staffs in PE (who articulated it rather poorly in the CAR but nevertheless did state it); and ACAS, CAS and err, that's it, in the RAF.
