The Airbus philosophy tells us, that when the AT is disconnected, the lever acts like a conventional one, position equal thrust, but in the bad case of an automatic disconnect, this is not true. The pilot has to un-detent the lever to get the correct position vs. thrust ratio. This is an unnecessary additional step in a high stress situation.
This is not quite correct. If the A/THR disconnects involuntarily (or fails) the ECAM will present:
ENG - ENGINE THRUST LOCKED
THR LEVERS.............................MOVE
Additionally the FMA will be flashing THR LCKD. This will be repeated every 5 seconds, with a single chime, until the levers are moved to match actual thrust setting - simply match the "doughnuts" (small circles above N1 gauge arc) to the indicated N1. So if the A/THR falls over - DON'T PANIC!!! the thrust setting has not changed. Assess what's going on and then move the levers - you now have control of the thrust.
Not having motorised levers has never presented me with any problems. I don't deny that the tactile feedback is lost but you just learn/retrain to utilise the visual feedback from the N1 gauges we're humans and adapting is what we are quite good at. The sidestick issue is different and, as a trainer on the bus, I acknowledge that the lack of feedback from the PF to the PNF is less than ideal.
In the case of AF 447 perhaps a requirement for the unreliable speed procedure should be the selection of the FLIGHT CONTROLS page on the systems display (lower centre screen). It would certainly enable the PNF and any other observer to see what inputs the PF was making - especially in a dark cockpit.
Good discussion guys,
A4