Hi,
Monitoring of Take-Off Slats/Flaps Settings during
Departure
EASA sib-Fatigue.pdf
The EASA sib introduction
Improper take-off configuration can have catastrophic
consequences. The Take-Off Configuration Warning System is
intended to give the flight crew warning of any potentially
dangerous configuration before take-off. From the number of
reported accidents and incidents where the system has failed
to function or flights crews failed to select the correct
configuration, it can be deduced that improved procedures
would enhance safety.
Recent accidents involving the McDonnell Douglas DC-9-80
(MD-80) and Boeing 737 families of aeroplanes have been
attributed to this situation.
The reasons why, on rare occasions, flight crews fail to select
the correct configuration are complex and due to many factors,
such as time pressures, stress, fatigue, mental saturation,
distractions, non user friendly checklists, etc.
The recommendation
Recommendations: EASA recommends the following:
1. Operations Procedures – Take-Off Flap/Slat Selection
From a human factors standpoint, the slats/flaps selection for
take-off should be made during times of lower workload and
least distraction.
It is therefore recommended that operators review and amend
their operations manual procedures, as applicable, so that
take-off slats/flaps selections are made before the aeroplane
taxis away from the ramp, provided that:
the applicable FCOM (or equivalent document) permits this
procedure; and
this does not conflict with prevailing conditions and
associated procedures, e.g. application of de-icing fluid,
taxiing in winter conditions, avoidance of foreign object
damage, encountered obstacles, etc..
Type approval holders should review their FCOM (or
equivalent document, as applicable) to determine whether
take-off slats/flaps selections can be made before the
aeroplane taxis away from the ramp, and make amendments,
if appropriate.
It should be remembered that introduction of changes to these
procedures will likely require approval by the competent
authority and may also introduce the need for additional flight
crew training.
2. Monitoring of Take-Off Slats/Flaps Checklist
Effectiveness
Operators are encouraged to check the effectiveness of Take-
off slats/flaps check list items by examining available in-service
recorded data, and by monitoring the instances that they are
not set at the expected time.
This recommendation is useless ... if the factors:
time pressures, stress, fatigue, mental saturation,
distractions, non user friendly checklists, etc are not eliminated or reduced at max
What are the EASA recommendations about those factors ?
EASA can release many SIB they want .. if the root factors are not eliminated .. those SIB are useless ...
A comb for bald IMHO