I haven't really had much chance to post my thoughts on this accident which is why I may have seemed short - apologies to all. This accident is not a machine driven thing but a human issue. The S and L of SHEL apply. But first some history - I have referred to Clipper skippers and this has a bearing on the accident under discussion. Pan Am during the sixties were one of the dominant airlines and their captains and co-pilots very highly regarded. However, this induced a culture of arrogance and complacency - pilots who were not suited to command were passed and protected by their friends. Checking methods were ignored and training especially with obscure and difficult airports was poor and perfunctory. This led to a series of accidents in the late 60s and early 70s with many fatalities. It also led to a culture change but Pan Am never really recovered from the problems caused. The parallels which struck me were a casual culture and a failure to train properly and address training issues. Air France seem to have developed a similar culture. I am sure that there are many responsible and professional pilots in that airline but reading their safety audit one could see issues that needed to be urgently addressed. Training has been neglected and too much faith placed in automation. To be honest I have no problem with automation - I have never flown an automated plane but would prefer to travel on one. Some of the stuff I have flown has very strange quirks and I am glad when I don't have to deal with it. Learmount totally misses the point when he blames automation - in itself it is not an issue with proper training. If the proper training is lacking then problems arise but as in the Pan Am illustration they are not restricted to automated airliners. Thus we can safely disregard automation or the machine as having any bearing on the accident apart from an initial causal incident.
What impressed me about the CVR transcript (and I do read and understand French well) was the failure to follow procedures and the total lack of CRM. Learmount characterises it as bewliderment but to my mind this is going too far. We have no evidence that the pilots were bewildered - rather that they were inadequately trained and had developed a culture which neglected SOPs. PJ2 in a reply to another correspondent mentioned that SOPs were vital. I fully concur - in the stuff I fly if you miss something you are very soon in trouble. You as a pilot are responsible for your aircraft and for being aware of your aircraft and its features. If you are an airline pilot you have an extra responsibility for your passengers but any pilot carrying extra people has an extra responsibility. This to my mind means you have to be extra careful and be aware that your actions will affect others lives. This means knowing your aircraft and knowing what to do if the aircraft gets into unusual situations. It means training and anticipation - avoidance is better than reaction. None of this happened in the case of AF447. We unfortunately must assign responsibility for this accident to the aircrew and the airline not the aircraft or its automation or its manufacturer. No other conclusion is valid and despite the agendas of some of the other posters this is the reality.