Im in general agreement with Smiling Ed and machinbirds posts, however the trim issue was a small hurdle to further overcome at the end of a long list of errors. I certainly respect the lifelong experience represented by so many of the forum posts- the kind of experience that safes lives when things go really wrong.
I think in this kind of accident there is a very large list of factors, and they all seemed to concoct for the worst on the day, at the edge of the flight envelope, and the PF's ability.
A few quick matters....I can see a very good argument for visibly linked controls. Its such an aid to situational awareness, and I feel non linked controls are a bit of a by product of low accident rate complacency.
Also,I dont see why an intelligent explicit emergency use of extrapolated speed data with sensible caveats may have at least alleviated the anxiety that seems to have paralysed the situational and perceptual awareness of the crew
The mental fog appears to have descended on the aircrew very early. There must be some professional habbits and training that can overcome what appears to have happened here. How effectivley do AF and the major carriers/ training organisations train to deal with false perceptual expectations/distraction/poor self awareness/anxiety/lax flight discipline/life
threatening CRM issues.
Im not sure how "worlds best practice" pilots do this. I know how I was taught by my most respected instructors and try to practice at my own aviation level.
I try to constantly practice "what ifs" as a trainig tool, as well as reviewing my first emergency responses so they are fluid, at times when they are not needed.
It was that kind of lifelong learning, self discipline,professionalism and deeply embedded training I saw in Sullenberger, that I dealy wish to emulate, and which set such a great example to all.
My day job is medical, but in my years working in emergency medicine, we used to have a saying..." In a crisis, take your own pulse first".
Last edited by Mimpe; 12th Aug 2011 at 00:22.